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Abstract
The robustness of detection filters applied to the detection of actuator failures on a
free-free beam is analyzed. This analysis is based on computer simulation tests of
the detection filters in the presence of different types of model mismatch, and on
frequency response functions of the transfers corresponding to the model mismatch.
The robustness of detection filters based on a model of the beam containing a large
number of structural modes varied dramatically with the placement of some of the
filter noles. The dynamics of these filters were very hard to analyze.
The design of detection filters with a number of modes equal to the number of
sensors was trivial. They can be configured to detect any number of actuator
failure events. The dynamics of these filters were very easy to analyze and their
robustness properties were much improved. A change of the output transformation
allowed the filter to perform satisfactorily with realistic levels of model mismatch.
	
Thesis Supervisor:	 Professor Wallace E. Vander Velde
	
Title:	 Thesis Supervisor
-3-
Acknowledgments
	 ► t
I would like to thank Professor Vander Velde for his technical advice and
patience over the past years, as well as for the opportunity to work on this project.
My appreciation goes out to Ping Lee for helping secure the computer resources. I
express gratitude to my friends and colleagues for their enlightening conversation,
suggestions and patient support in the preparation of this thesis. I thank all of my
friends and family for their patience displayed while I sang my thesis blues. To my
parents, Baby and Salvador, I send my thanks and love for their emotional and
financial support, but most of all for their unending encouragement and selflessness
in allowing me to pursue my dreams. I would especially like to thank my wife
Susan for the encouragement and love demonstrated by volunteering for the
arduous and difficult task of typing this thesis.
I would also like to thank the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
for sponsoring this work under NASA Grant #NAG1-126.
.z
8	
11
-4-
Table of Contents
Abstract	 2
Acknowledgments
	 3
Table of Contents	 4
List of Figures	 6
List of Tables	 8
1. Introduction	 9
2. Failure Detection Filter Theory 	 12
2.1 The Failure Detection Filter Problem 14
2.2 Fully Measurable Systems 18
2.3 Partially Measurable Systems 20
2.3.1 Single Failure Detection 20
2.3.1.1 The Detection Space 20
2.3.1.2 Detection Theorem 23
2.3.1.3 Algorithms 27
2.3.2 Multiple Failure Detection 32
2.3.2.1 Algorithms 33
3. Dynamics of Flexible Space Structures 	 35
3.1 The Flexible Beam Model	 35
3.2 Filter Design for Actuator Failure Events 	 40
3.3 Computer Simulation
	 42
4. Failure Detection with Model Mismatch 	 46
4.1 Detection Filter Dynamics 51
4.1.1 Structural Mode Dynamics 51
4.1.2 Detection Space Dynamics 52
4.1.3 Model Error Dynamics 54
4.1.3.1 Unmodeled Modes 55
4.1.3.2 Parameter Errors in A 57
4.1.3.3 Parameter Errors in B 60
4.1.3.4 Parameter Errors in C 62
4.1.3.5 Parameter Errors in A, B and C 63
4.2 Frequency Response Analysis 64
4.3 Reduced Order Detection Filters 84
4.3.1 Detection Filters with N = p 85
4.3.2 Improved Output Transformation 98
4.3.3 Detection Filter With Observer 124
-5-
S. Conclusions and Recommendations	 130
6	 k
-6-
List of Figures
Figure 2-1: The Failure Detection Filter 13
Figure 3-1: The Simulated Uniform Beam 36
Figure 3-2: Detection Filter #1.	 No model mismatch.	 Actuator 3 44
failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 3-3: Detection Filter #1.	 No model mismatch.	 Actuator 4 45
failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-1: Detection Filter #1. Eighth Mode is Unmodeled. Actuator 47
4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-2: Detection Filter #1. Parameter Uncertainties in Matrix A 49
= 0.05%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-3: Detection Filter #1. Parameter Uncertainties in Matrix B 49
= 0.05%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-4: Detection Filter #1. Parameter Uncertainties in Matrix C 50
= 0.05%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-5: Structural Mode Dynamics 51
Figure 4-6: Modal Frequency Response 52
Figure 4-7: Detection Space Transfer 54
Figure 4-8: Unmodeled Modes Error Dynamics 57
Figure 4-9: Error Dynamics for Model Error in A 60
Figure 4-10: Error Dynamics for Model Error in B. 61
Figure 4-11: Error Dynamics for Model Error in C 63
Figure 4-12: Detection Filter #1. Unmodeled Mode Transfer 67
Figure 4-13: Detection Filter #1.
	
Parameter Errors in A = 0.05%. G9
Transfer from 0 to E and E .
FilterDetection
	
#1 *
	 Errors in B = 0.05%.Figure 4-14: 71
Transfer from u to E and E .A.Detection F3ilter	 Parameter Errors in C = 0.05%.Figure 4-15: 73
Transfer from 0 to E and E4.
Figure 4-16:	 Detection Filter #2. Unmodeled Mode Transfer 75
Figure 4-17: Detection	 Filter	 #2.	 Eighth	 Mode	 is	 Unmodeled. 76
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-18: Detection Filter #2.
	 Parameter Errors in A = 0.05%. 77
Transfer from 0 to E and E
FilterDetection	 #1	 Parameter Errors in Matrix A =Figure 4-19: 78
0.05%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-20: Detection Filter #2. Parameter Errors in Matrix A = 1%. 78
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-21: Detection Filter #2. 	 Parameter Errors in B = 0.05%. 80
Transfer from u to E and E it.Detection Filter	 Parameter Errors in Matrix B =Figure 4-22: 81
0.05%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-23: Detection Filter #2.	 Parameter Errors in Matrix B = 81
5%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 4-24: Detection Filter #2.
	 Parameter Errors in C = 0.05%. 82
Transfer from 03 to E3 and E4.
-7-
Figure 4-2E:	 Detection Filter #2.	 Parameter Errors in C = 0.05%. 83
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 see.
Figure 4-26:	 The	 Failure	 Detection	 Filter	 with	 Output	 Vector 88
Transformation
Figure 4-27:	 Detection Filter #3.	 Parameter Errors in B = 0.05%. 94
Transfer from u to E and ER = Pseudo Inverse.
FilterFigure 4-28:	 Detection	 #i	 Unmodeled Eighth Mode Transfer. 96
R = Pseudo Inverse
Figure 4-29:	 Detection Filter #3.	 No Model Mismatch.	 Actuator 4 97
Failure at T = 1 sec.. R = Pseudo Inverse. Output Filtering.
Figure 4.30:	 Detection Filter #3. Four Unmodeled Modes. Actuator 4 97
Failure at T = 1 sec.. R = Pseudo Inverse. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-31:	 Decoupled Dynamics of Detection Filters with N = p. 100
Figure 4-32:	 Frequency Response of the Disturbance Transfer. 101
Figure 4-33:	 Detection Filter #3.	 Unmodeled Eighth Mode Transfer. 104
R = Improved Transformation.
Figure 4-34:	 Detection Filter #3. Four Unmodeled Modes. Actuator 4 105
Failure at T = 1 sec..	 R = Improved Transformation.	 Output
Filtering.
Figure 4-35:	 Detection Filter #3. Four Unmodeled Modes. Parameter 107
Errors in A, B and C = 5%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.. 	 R
= Improved Transformation. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-36:	 Detection Filter #3. Four Unmodeled Modes. Parameter 108
Errors in A, B and C = 10%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.. R
= Improved Transformation. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-37:	 New Output Error Processing 109
Figure 4-38:	 Detection Filter #4. No Model Mismatch. 	 Actuator 1 112
Failure at T = 1 sec.. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-39:	 Detection Filter #4.	 No Model Mismatch.	 Actuator 4 113
Failure at T = 1 sec.. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-40:	 Detection Filter #4. Four Unmodeled Modes. Actuator 1 116
Failure at T = 1 s-c.. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-41:	 Detection Filter #4. Four Unmodeled Modes. Actuator 4 117
Failure at T = 1 sec.. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-42:	 Detection Filter #5. 	 No Unmodeled Modes. 	 Actuator 1 119
Failure at T = 1 sec.. Output Filtering
Figure 4-43:	 Detection Filter #5. Four Unmodeled Modes. Actuator 1 121
Failure at T = 1 sec.. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-44:	 Detection Filter #3. 	 No Model Mismatch. 	 Actuator 1 122
Failure at T = 1 sec.. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-45:	 Detection Filter #3. Four Unmodeled Modes. Actuator 1 123
Failure at T = 1 sec.. Output Filtering.
Figure 4-46:	 The Detection Filter with Observer 125
Figure 4-47:	 Detection Filter #3 with Observer.	 Failure of Actuator 4 129
at T _ 1 sec.. Output Filtering.
-8-
List of Tables
Table 3-I: Modal Frequencies and Normalized Mode Shapes (taken 38
from reference 141)
-4-
Chapter 1
Introduction
It is expected, with the advent of the space shuttle, that large space
structures serving a variety of mission requirements will be assembled in space in
the near future. Some of the structures being contemplated include antennas,
reflectors and solar power satellites. They are characterized by their light weight
and very large sizes, which in turn result in low frequency bending properties with
very little structural damping.
The active control of large space structures will include station keeping
control, attitude zontrol, shape control and vibrational damping. The component
unreliability issue is most important in the last of these applications where
hundreds of sensors and actuators will be needed in order to actively damp the
many vibrational modes to assure mission success. The large number of
components in the system result in a high probability of a component failure in a
short period of time, even assuming components having very optimistic mean time
between failures. For example, a system with 200 components, each having a time
between failures of 100,000 hours, is expected to have 17 component failures a
year (7). Even if these control systems are serviced in orbit, it is desired that its
service interval be as long as possible, at least one year. Therefore, it will be
necessary to design control systems that can tolerate the number of component
failures occurring during the service interval. This, in turn, will require systems
that can detect and identify a component failure, and will require control systems
that can be reconfigured to perform without the failed component in some optimal
-1a
fashion.
The failure detection and identification systems (FDI) depend on hardware 	 '
redundancy or analytic redundancy in order to detect and identify a failed
component. An example of hardware redundancy to detect and identify sensor
failures is the one that involves triplication of sensors, where the failure of a
component is detected when there is a discrepancy between the signals of two
sensors and comparison with the third determines which of the two has failed.
Because of the large weight and cost resulting from hardware redundancy, these
systems are not attractive for applications in large space structures. The FDI
systems based on analytic redundancy use knowledge of the plant dynamics to
make the detection and identification of the failure. Some of these systems require
specification of the failure modes ahead of time.
The Failure Detection Filter is a closed loop method, based on analytic
redundancy, to detect and identify actuator and sensor failures, and changes in
plant dynamics. A very attractive property of the detection filter is that it does
not require specificaton of the mode of failure.
The Failure Detection Filter is a linear filter having the some configuration as
an observer but with an additional constraint in the design of the gain matrix
D. The output error, the difference between the system measurements and the
filter estimate of those measurements, is zero when the system is operating
nominally (assuming no model mismatch). When a failure occurs, the output error
becomes nonzero, indicating that a component has failed. Moreover, the additional
constraint on the gain matrix D keeps the output error in a single direction in the
output space. The failed component can then be identified by this direction.
The failure detection filter was first proposed by Beard (11 for deterministic
-11-
systems. Jones 151 explained detection filter theory using a more geometric
approach and expanded it to stochastic and sampled data systems. Detection
Filter Theory was applied by Cariguan 121 in the context of flexible space
structures, where he considered actuator and sensor failure events, and analyzed
the performance of the filter in the presence of unmodeled modes. He developed
the computer software used in this thesis to design detection filters and to simulate
the dynamics of the plant with the filter.
The goal in this thesis, is to improve the performance of detection filters in
detecting and identifying actuator failures in an undamped flexible structure, in the
presence of model mismatch. To achieve this goal, the filter performance will be
Evaluated in the presence of unmodeled modes and different levels of parameter
errors. In addition, the transfer properties of the filter will be analyzed and the
results compared with the simulations.
In Chapter 2, the main results of detection filter theory are introduced along
with analytical procedures for the filter design. Chapter 3 describes the model of
the undamped flexible beam, shows some properties of the detection filter design
for actuator failures, and simulates the filter with no model mismatch.
In Chapter 4, the detection filter performance in the presence of model
mismatch is analyzed using simulations and frequency response functions. Ways of
improving the filter performance derived from this analysis are presented in the
chapter. Chapter 5 contains the conclusions and recommendations for further
research.
-12-
Chapter 2
Failure Detection Filter Theory
The Failure Detection Filter is a linear filter having the same
configuration as a full order observer (Fig. 2-1). It includes a model of the nominal
system and is driven by the same actuator commands as the actual system. The
output error, the difference between the system measurements and the filter
estimate of those measurements, is multiplied by the gain matrix D and fed-back to
the filter.
In a full order observer, the only constraint placed upon the gain matrix D is
that the eigenvalues of the matrix (A - DC) must have negative real parts. When
this is the case, the observer is stable and the state and output errors become zero
(except for noise and other unmodeled effects) during nominal operation. When a
component failure occurs, the output error will become nonzero. Therefore, any
stable observer can detect when the system has failed. What distinguishes a Failure
Detection Filter from such an observer is that the gain matrix D has the additional
constraint of restricting the output error due to a particular failure to a single line
in the output space. The direr. Zion of that line is used to identify which component.
has failed.
Pole placement in Detection Filter design can be used not only to assure the
stability of the filter, but to improve the performance of the filter in the presence
of unmodeled system dynamics. Therefore, complete control of the Detection Filter
poles is required. This requirement together with the output directionality
constraint are the bases of Detection Filter Theory and are present in the definition
-13-
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Figure 2-1: The Failure Detection Filter
of Failure Detectability.
Detection Filter Theory consists mainly of two parts: 1) a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions that must be satisfied for the solution of a particular
detection filter problem to exist, and 2) a set of algorithms to achieve the design.
In this chapter, the state and output error equations are presented for both
nominal and failed system operation. The concept of Failure Detectability will
then be introduced, and important results concerning necessary and sufficient
conditions will be stated. Finally, an algorithm for filter design based on
annhilating minimal polynomials will be presented.
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2.1 The Failure Detection Filter Problem
The model that describes the plant dynamics must be linear, time-invariant
and observable. It is not necessary that the system be observable but only that the
model be observable. An observable model can be obtained by removing the
unobservable dynamics from it. This does not reduce the effectiveness of the FDI
system because failures that affect only the unobservable part of the plant
dynamics cannot be detected.
The unfailed system is represented by the equations:
#(t)=Ax(t) +Bu(t) 	 2.1)
Y( t) = C x(t)
where
x(t) is the n dimensional state vector,
u(t) is the m dimensional control vector,
y(t) is the p dimensional measurement vector.
The structure of the Failure Detection Filter is shown in (2-1). Due to the
similarity between detection filters and observers, the filter state vector x is called
the state estimate and y is called the measurement estimate.
The filter equations are:
X(t)= Ai(t) +Bu,(t)+D[y(t)-Y(t)]
y(t)=C*0
The state error is defined as:
i
-15-
e(t) _ :(t) - i(t)
The measurement error is defined as:
E( t) = Y( t) - *(t)
The state and measurement equations are obtained by subtracting equations
(2.1) from (2.2). In the normal mode, u(t) = uc(t), and
A(t) = (A - DC) e(t)	 (2.3)
E(t) = C e(t)
If the eigenvalues of the matrix (A - DC) have negative real parts, the state
and measurement errors will become zero in the steady state. This is true,
however, only when the system is operating nominally. When a component failure
M. 
occurs, the state and output error equations (2.3) are no longer valid since
equations (2.1) no longer represent the true system. The new state and output
error equations will depend on the type of component that failed.
Consider the failure of actuator j. The true control u(t) that is being applied
to the plant is
U(t) = uc (!) + emi q(t)
where uc (t) is the desired control, 
eml is a unit vector in the jth direction of
dimension m, and q(t) is a scalar time function equal to the difference between the
commanded input to actuator j and the actual control being applied by this
actuator.
The new system equations are
F.
where bj is the column of B corresponding to the jth actuator.
The new state and output error equations with actuator j failure are obtained
by combining (2.2) and (2.4)
6(t) = (A - DC) e(t) + b  q(t)	 (2.5)
e(t) = C e(t)
The goal of Detection Filter design, in this example, is to find a gain matrix
D such that e(t) maintains a fixed direction in the output space when actuator j
fails (and at the same time assign almost arbitrarily the eigenvalues of matrix [A-
DCJ). Since only directionality is important in the identification of the failed
component, the vector b  is the only element in equaticn (2.5) that characterizes
the failure of actuator j. For this reason, the vector b j is called the event vector
associated with actuator ; Failure. The forcing function q(t) depends on the mode
of failure of the actuator, and knowledge of ' this signal (or of the failure mode) is
not needed in the use of a detection filter. This characteristic makes Failure
Detection Filters very attractive for failure detection and identification.
For the rest of the chapter, the detection problem is generalized to the
detection and identification of the component failure associated with the event
vector f, and whose corresponding state and output error equations are
6(t) = (A - DC) e(t) + f q(t)	 (2.6)
c(t) = e(t)
The discussion in this section, so far, can be summarized by the following
-17-
definition of detectability found in Beard [1].
Definition: The failure event associated with event vector f in (2.6) is
detectable if there exists a matrix D such that
(1) C e,(t) maintains a fixed direction in the output
space (where eb( t) is the settled-out solution
of (2.61 ) and,
(2) at the same time, all eigenvalues of (A - DC) can be
specified almost arbitrarily.
Condition (1) is the distinguishing feature of the failure detection filter and
serves to identify which component has failed. Condition (2) is needed to assure
that the matrix (A - DC) is stable so that during nominal operation, equation (2.3),
the initial state and output errors die out to zero, and in the presence of component
failure, equation (2.6), the output error is unidirectional. Condition (2) also allows
the designer of a failure detection filter to adjust the bandwidth of the filter to
suppress the effects of unmodeled system dynamics, as will be shown in Chapter 5.
Given a failure event, the detection filter problem consists of: determining
whether the event is detectable and, if it is detectable, to find the gain matrix
that makes the output error unidirectional and assigns the desired poles to the
filter.
In the next section, the detection filter prob!em is solved for both fully
measurable systems (rank C = n) and partially measurable systems (rank C < n).
of the matrix W f defined as
-1&
2.2 Fully Measurable Systems
A fully measurable system is a system whose state vector x(t) can be
solved uniquely given the measurement vector y(t), for any time t. Therefore, a
system is fully measurable if and only if
rank C = n
this implies that the number of sensors p > n.
The solution of the detection filter problem for this type of system is very
simple. Choose a gain matrix D such that
(A - DC) = - oI
where I is the identity matrix and o is a positive scalar constant.
eigenvalues of (A - DC) are -o, and the resulting filter is stable.
that satisfies (2.7) is given uniquely by
D = (A + a I) C-1
if rank C = n = p, and non-uniquely by
D = (A + a I) (CTC)-1 CT
(2.7)
Then all the
The matrix D
(2.8)
(2.9)
if rank C =n<p.
To prove that this choice of D satisfies condition (1) of detectability, a result
from linear systems theory will be used. When the failure associated with event
vector f occurs, the state error in (2.6) will be driven by f q(t) within a subspace
of R" called the controllable space of f. This subspace is given by the range space
r
W1 = I f (A - DC)f . . . (A - DC)"-1f I	 (2.10)
Since E = C e, the output error will lie in a subspace of R P given by the range
space of the matrix CWt .
For thin choice of matrix D, the matrix CW f becomes
CW f = I Cf _O-Cf oZCf . . . (-Q) ►~1Cf 
1
and the range space of CW t is simply the one-dimensional space spanned by the
vector Cf. Therefore, when the failure occurs, the output error will remain in a
single direction given by the vector Cf. Hence, the gain matrix D given by (2.8) or
(2.9) also satisfies condition (1) of detectability. Any matrix D which satisfies this
condition is called a detector gain for f.
From the preceding proof, note that this choice of D (2.8) or (2.9) is a
detector gain for any event vector f in R". This implies that a single detection
filter can be used to detect and identify every failure associated with every event
vector f in R" (except that it wouldn't be able to identify two failures that have the
same event vector f).
The solution of the failure detection filter problem in the case of fully
measurable systems is trivial. Choosing (A - DC) = -v I assured the stability of
the filter and also produced unidirectional output errors in the event of component
failures.
In a partially measurable system A C <n and therefore, the state vector
x(t) cannot be solved uniquely given the measurements y(t). In the previous section
it was shown that when a system is fully measurable, a single detection filter can
be designed to detect and identify every event f in R". This property is lost when
the system is partially measurable, and more than one detection filter may be
needed to detect a given set of failure events. Moreover, in such detection filters,
there are subspaces of R" containing event vectors that produce the same
unidirectional output. These subspaces are called Detection Spaces and are very
important in the analysis and design of detection filters, for both single and
multiple detection.
2.3.1 Single Failure Detection
This section explores the detection problem for a single failure event. The
definition of detection space is introduced and is later used to prove the
detection theorem. Algorithms for the design of detection filters, based on the
proof of the detection theorem, are then discussed.
2.3.1.1 The Detection Space
Assuming that (A,C) is an observable pair, Jones defines the detection space
for the event f in the following way:
Definition 2.3-1 Assume that Cf is not zero. The detection space for f is
denoted by R, and is the direct sum:
i)Rf=f(DRf
where Rt C R" is the largest subspace which satisfies the two
-21-
conditions:
ii) Rf C n(C)
iii) A Rf C Rf
This definition is motivated by condition (1) of detestability, and serves to
derive a formula to generate detector gains. By condition ii) and iii) of Definition
2.3-1:
(A- DC) RfCARrCRI
(A - DC) Rf C 9f	 (2.11)
Assuming that Cf 34 0, condition i) and ii) imply that:
CRf=Cf®CRf=Cf®O=Cf
dim (C Rd = dim (Cf) = 1	 (2.12)
Now, assume that D is chosen such that:
(A - DC) f= f e R f	 (2.13)
for some arbitrary f in Rf . From (2.11), (2.13) and i), it follows that Rf is an
invariant space with respect to (A - DC) for this choice of D since:
(A - DC) 11f = (A - DC) (f (D Rf) C Rr
(A - DC) Rf C Rf
	(2.14)
Since R, contains the event vector f, and since R, is invariant with respect to
(A - DC) (for this choice of D), the controllable space of f, spanned by the columns
of the matrix W f defined in (2.10), is a subspace of R,:
-22-
Cf C Rf 	(2.15)
where C, is the controllable space of f.
Then, from (2.12) and (2.15):
CCr = Cf	 (2.16)
dim (CC,) = 1
and the failure associated with f generates unidirectional output errors along Cf.
Therefore, the gain matrix D chosen in (2.13) is a detector gain. Moreover, by
the same argument that led to (2.16) and since (A •. DC,C) is an observable pair,
any event vector in R r produces the same unidirectional output Cf. Jones [51 calls
this property detection equivalence and proved that the detection space R,
contains all the event vectors that are detection equivalent to f.
Since, as it was proved, the gain D satisfying (2.13) is a detector gain, this
equation can be solved for D to obtain an expression for the detector gain of f.
Equation (2.13) can be written as:
DCf=Af - F	 (2.17)
where f E Rt, and its solution is
D=DP+DH
where
DP = (A f - ^) [(Cf)T Cf]-1 (Cf)T	(2.18)
DH = D' I 1. Cf ( (Cf)T Cf]-I (Cf)T 
1
i
-23-
with f E R and D' an arbitrary matrix with the same dimension as D.
The detector gain of f is given by (2.18) with any f E R f and ar
The eigenvalues of (A - DC) will depend on the choice if f E R, and I
question is whether all the eigenvalues of (A - DC) can be arbitrarily s
the proper choice of f e R f and W. This question is addressed in the next section.
Up to this point, it has been assumed that Cf 3P6 0. If Cf = 0, it can be
shown that the definition of detection space and all the results derived so far, can
be extended by replacing If by A' f, where u > 0 is the smallest integer, such that
CA's f 34 0. To simplify the analysis, it will be assumed for the rest of this chapter
that Cf34O.
2.3.1.2 Detection Theorem
In this section, it will be shown that the freedom represented by the choice of
t e Rf and D' in equation (2.18) is enough to assign all the eigenvalues of (A - DC)
arbitrarily.
First, a theorem proved by Beard and Jones is stated.
Theorem 2.3.1 Let dim (R f) = of . There exists a unique vector g ( R.f,
called the detection generator of R f, such that:
i) Ak g(Rf k=0,192....I(vf-2)
ii) C Avf -1 g = Cf
This theorem implies that the vectors g, A g, ... , A vf -1 g are a basis for Rf.
Since f e RP  f can be expressed as
f=o 1 g+a2 Ag+...+arvf-1 Avt -2 g+Avf -1 g	 (2.19)
(
(2.20)
-24-
where o
vt 
= 1 by ii).
Also, since f c Rr, f can be written as
= a1g+a2Ag +... +av t Avt'1g
Write (2.13) as
DCf=Af - f	 (2.21)
and use (2.19) and (2.20) to get
Af - =- a,g +(a1-a2) Ag+(a2-a3)A2g+..
+ (avt 	 r_ 1 - avf Avt' 1 g + Avt g	 (2.22)
Define P 1 = -a 1 , P2 = a 1 - a2, .... pvt = avt-1 - avr, and write (2.22) as
Af= =P 1 g+P2 Ag+...+pvr Avr -1 g+Avtg	 (223)
Equation (2.21) can now be written as
DCf=p 1 g+...+pvr 
Avr - 1 g +Avtg 	 (2.24)
It is easy to prove, using Theorem 2.3.1, that
Ak g = (A - DC) k g	 for 0 < k < yr	 (2.25)
Therefore, (2.24) can be expressed as
0=P 1 g+P2 (A- DC) g +...+pvr(A-DC)vr-1g+Avtg-DCf
and, since Cf = C Avt -1 g, using (2.25) we get
0 = P 1 g + p2 (A - DC) g + ... + p vr (A - DC)vt -1 g + (A - DC)vt g (2.20)
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Write (2.26) as
ti(A- DC) g =0
where the polynomial 1G(•) is defined
+L(7)=Pt+P2'Y+...+pv f 07 -1+ryvr
The polynomial tp(•) is the minimal annihilating polynomial of g with
respect to (A - DC) (5). Therefore, the eigenvalues of (A - DC) associated with the
detection space R f are given by the roots of
ON =0
or
p l
+p2 a+...+pv t
a"r
-1 +Xvr= 0	 (2.27)
For each set of eigenvalues of (A - DC) associated with Rp th-re is a unique
set of coefficients p l' p2'	 . , pv a unique set of coefficients a l , a,,, ... , av and,
r	 -	 r
therefore, there is a unique ^ E R r. Hence, the of detection space eigenvalues of (A -
DC) cau be assigned arbitrarily by the proper choice of ^ E Rr in (2.18). Condition
ii) of detectability will be satisfied only if the remaining n - of eigenvalues can be
assigned arbitrarily by choice of D' in ( 2.18).
By replacing D from (2.18) into (A-DC) get
A-DC=A'-D'C'
where
A' = A - D P C
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and
C' = I I - Cf [(Cf)T Cf ]-1 (Cf)T J C	 (2.28)
Matrix D from (2.18) makes R f invariant with respect to (A - DC) and (A'-
D'C'). Since D' is an arbitrary matrix, R f is also invariant with respect to A':
A' R(
 
C Rf
	
(2.29)
Since:
C'R =C'(f ® Rf) =CT @ C'Rr 0
the detection space Rf is in the null space of C':
Rf
 C 11(C')	 (2.30)
From (2.29) and (2.30), it can be concluded that the detection space R f is a
subspace of the unobservable space of the (A', C') pair:
R f C IAM)
where M is defined as
C'
M = C'A'
Since:
C'17(M)=0
( 2.31)
using equation (2.28) get
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C n(M) = Cf	 (2.32)
But since n(M) is an invariant space with respect to A' and to (A - DC),
equation (2.32) implies that
q(M) C Rr	 ( 2 .33)
Hence, by (2.31) and (2.33):
Rj = n(M)	 (2.34)
Given an unobservable pair (A', C'), the theory of linear systems says that all
of the eigenvalues of (A' - D'C') can be placed arbitrarily by choice of D' except
those eigenvalues associated with the unobservable space of (A', C'), which are
fixed. But since the unobservable space of (A', C') is the detection space of R p the
fixed eigenvalues of (A' - D'C') are the of eigenvalues associated with Rf, and were
assigned by the choice of ^ c R, in (2.18). Therefore, the matrix D' in (2.18))
assigns arbitrarily the remaining n - v t eigenvalues of (A - DC) and condition ii) of
detestability is satisfied.
The results of this section are summarized with the statement of the
Detestability Theorem.
Theorem 2.3.2 Every vector in the state space R" is detectable if and only
if (A,C) is observable.
2.3.1.3 Algorithms
The algorithms presented in this section are based on the proof of the
detestability theorem, and were suggested by Beard (1).
(1) Detection Space Algorithm
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This algorithm is used to obtain the detection space Rr and its dimension yr
of the event f. From (2.34), the detection space R r is in the null space of the
matrix M defined in (2.31). The matrices C' and A' present in this definition were
introduced in (2.28), where C' depends only on f and A' is a function of D P . The
detector gain DP is defined in (2.18) for any C E Rr. Therefore, the detection space
Rr is in the null space of any M that results from any choice of ^ E R r in (2.18).
Since, from definition(2.3-1), the only vectors C known to be in Rr are the ones in
the subspace spanned by f, the vector = 0 e R r is chosen and the A' resulting
from this choice is called Kr:
Kr = A - A f [(Cf) T Cf]- 1 (Cf)T C	 (2.35)
Hence the algorithm to obtain Rr and yr is
Rr = Or)
v f = n - rank Mr
where
C'
M f = C'li f	 (2.36)
C'Kn-1
with C' given by (2.28) and K f by (2.35).
(2) Detection Gain Algorithms
These algorithms perform the actual detection filter design. They calculate
the gain matrix D that satisfies condition i) of delectability, and assigns the matrix
(A - DC) the desired eigenvalues.
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The gain D given by equation (2.18) is a detector gain, and therefore satisfies
condition i) of detectability. The choice of t E Rr assigns the yr eigenvalues of (A -
DC) associated with R r, and the choice of D' assigns the remaining n - t!r
eigenvalues associated with the completion of the state space R".
(a) DP Algorithm
This algorithm calculates D P in (2.18) given a specified set of yr eigenvalues to
be assigned to (A - DC), and that will be associated with R r.
 
It the yr eigenvalues
are specified as the roots of the polynomial
svr+p
vr 
st'f-'-+..-+p2s+pl=0
then, as it was proved, the matrix (A f - ^) must satisfy equation (2.23). Hence, by
substituting (2.23) into (2.18) get
DP = q [(Cf)T Cf]
-1 (Cf)T 	 (2.37)
where
q—plg+p2Ag+...+pvrAvf-1g+Avrg
The detection generator g can be found by first using algorithm 1) to obtain
the detection space R r and then apply the property of g stated in Theorem 2.3.1 to
get g E Rr. A convenient way of executing these two steps is using orthogonal
reduction, as suggested by Beard [1].
Once g is obtained, the matrix D P is simpiy calculated using (2.37) and is
unique for a given set of yr eigenvalues.
(b) DH Algorithm
This algorithm assigns the remaining n - yr eigenvalues of (A - DC) by
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choosing the appropriate D' in (2.18) to calculate D H. These n - of eigenvalues are
associated with the completion of the state space R", and their specifications do
not determine a unique D' (and a unique D H and D). Therefore, given an event f
and a complete set of eigenvalues to be assigned to (A - DC), the solution of the
detection problem will not be unique. For simplicity, the algorithm presented here
is based on the same procedure used to assign the eigenvalues to R f and obtain DP.
For this reason, this algorithm adds certain constraints to the detection problem
and generates a unique DH that together with DP give a unique gain D as the
solution of the detector problem.
The matrix D H is given by (2.18), where D' can be considered as the gain
matrix of the system (A', C'):
A-DC=A'-D'C'
with A' and C' given by (2.28).
Beard showed that there are a set of vectors w i that have the same property
with respect to (A', C') as the detection generator g with respect to (A, C):
C'A' P wj = 0	 for 0 < p < qj -1
C'A'gj 1 wj 34 0
There are (rank C - # of events) of these vectors. They and the
corresponding qj can be obtained as a byproduct, when applying orthogonal
reduction to find the null space of M in (2.31) or M f in (2.36) (Beard showed that M
= M f).
The vectors wj, A'wj, . . . , A'gj -1 wj span a subspace called completion
space Ci . These spaces are the equivalent of R f to (A', C'). It can be shown that
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the spaces R, , C 1 , C2 , .... C l are all nonintersecting and
R"= Rt (D C1 ®C2 ® ... ®C l 	 (2.38)
where	 '
Cinq. o = l
R, f1 Cj = 0
and
I
qj = n - vf
j=1
This algorithm assigns qj eigenvalues to (A' - D'C') by making !^- an
invariant space with respect to (A' - D'C'). Therefore, the same algorithm used to
find Dp is used to get D'. Equation (2.37) is modified by substituting A' for A, wi
for g and C'A'gi -1 w. for -1. Hence, the D' that makes all C j invariant and assigns
the remaining n - v, eigenvalues of (A'-D'C'), is given by
D' = j, 	 W)T C' W] -1 (C , W)T	 (2.39)
where
IP = 	
'P1 , W2, . . . , V)l I
7/Jj = pi wj + ...+p q A' Qj 1 wj + A'qj wj
W = [ A'q l -1 w1 , ...
 I A'ql-I WI I
Beard showed that W can also be calculated as
W = f Kq 1 -1 w1 , ... , Kql-
1 	 wl J
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where K, is defined in (2.35).
2.3.2 Multiple Failure Detection
This section deals with the problem of designing a single detection filter to
detect a set of failure events If, ... fr}. This set of events is mutually detectable
by a single detection filter, if there exists a D that satisfies the conditions of
detectability for all the f i . For single failure detection, if (A,C) is an observable
pair, any event f E R" is detectable. But for multiple failure detection, complete
observability is not a sufficient condition. The Group Detection Theorem
states a necessary and sufficient condition for a set of output separable vectors,
as defined below, to be mutually detectable.
Definition: The vectors If,...fr ) are output separable if
rkCF=r
where
F = I Au l f1 , ... 7 A ur fr 
1	
(2.40)
with ui > 0 defined as the smallest integer, such that CAN f i 3/- 0.
It can be shown that if the set of events are output separable
Rf.
s	 i
nR, =0 , i34 j	 (2.41)
Before stating the Group Detection Theorem, the following definition is
necessary.
Definition: The group detection order of the set {fl ...fr } is defined as,
the dimension of the null space of M F, (n - rk MF) where M F is defined as M, in
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(2.36) with f replaced by F in C' and Kf.
Group Detection Theorem The output separable vectors f f 1 . . .fr ) are
mutually detectable if and only if the sum of the individual detection orders of the
sat fi is equal to the group detection order.
2.3.2.1 Algorithms
Given a set of event vectors (fl . . .fr), the algorithm must first determine
whether the events are output separable by using (2.40). If they are output
separable, it must then determine whether they are mutually detectable by
applying the group detection theorem.
If the events are output separable and mutually detectable, the
procedure to calculate D is the same as the one described in the previous section for
single failure detection, but with f replaced by F
D=DP+DH
where
DP = Q [ ( CF )T CF] -1 (CF)T 	(2.42)
with
Q= [ ql' ... ^qrJ
qi = pi gi + ... + pv At'i -1 8i Avt B{
where gi and vi are the detection generator and detection order of the event f i .
DH
 = D' f I - CF [(CF ,T CF] -1
 (CF)T 
J
where
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D'= IF [(C'FW)T C'FW 1-1 (C'FW)T
with
W = I Kq1 -1 w 1 , . . . , Kql -1 
W 
and
. = pJj wj + ... + Wq A'qj -1 wj+ A'qj wj
where C'F and A' are defined in (2.28), with A' calculated using D P in (2.42) and
C'F calculated using F in place of f.
Beard [1] shows a method to obtain the vectors wj and the corresponding qj,
that consists of applying orthogonal reduction to find the null space of the matrix
MF.
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Chapter 3
Dynamics of Flexible Space Structures
Flexible structures are characterized by very low natural damping and by
infinitely dimensioned plant dynamics. The design of detection filters for flexible
space structures must, therefore, be based on a reduced order model of the system.
Moreover, the parameters of the reduced order model are not exactly known, and
the effect of parameter errors and of unmodeled dynamics can be very serious.
In this thesis, the dynamics of a uniform flexible beam are used to analyze the
performance of detection filters in the presence of model mismatch. The model of
this flexible b.;am corresponds to an experimental beam that was assembled at
NASA Langley Research Center. In this chapter, the model of the experimental
beam will be described along with the design of detection filters for actuator failure
events. The detection filter wiil then be evaluated with no model mismatch.
3.1 The Flexible Beam Model
The beam is made of aluminum (M = 0.502 slugs) and is twelve feet long
with a 6" x 3/16" cross section [4]. It is equipped with four force actuators and
four colocated displacement sensors (Fig. 3-1), that apply forces and measure
displacement along the same direction in the vibration plane.
The partial differential equation that describes the dynamics of the undamped
beam is
-36-
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Figure 3-1: The Simulated Uniform Beam
a4
 
	 a=y
EIat4 +mad =f(E,t)	 (3.1)
where	 E = position along the beam
y = displacement
E = modulus
m = mass per unit length
I = cross section inertia
f = distributed force per unit length
The distributed force f(E , t) given by the four point actuators is
4
f(E , t) 
_ E 6(E - (j) uj{t)	 (3.2)
j=1
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where e  is the position of the jth actuator and u,4t) is the control being applied by
it.
The solution of the partial differential equation is
co
Y(E , t) _	 Os(E) OX I)	 (3.3)
i=1
where 0,4c) are the mode shapes and ,p,41) are the modal amplitudes. The mode
shapes 0 ,4c) comprise an orthogonal and normalized set of functions over (0, I), and
the modal amplitudes tp ={t) satisfy an uncoupled set of differential equations
d 2 t^ i{t^	 2	 1	 4
dt2	
+ wi ►/i ={t) = M	 1: 0,(fj) uj(t)	 i = 1, 2,	 oc	 (3.4)
j— I
where M = m X 1 is the mass of the beam and w i is the natural frequency of the
A mode.
The orthogonal mode shapes Oi and the natural frequencies w i were obtained
for the first ten modes at Langley, by performing a finite element analysis ( .11. In
Table (3-1) the natural frequencies and mode shape values at positions 0.5 ft.., 2.5
ft., 6.0 ft., and 9 . 5 ft., are given for the first eight modes - two rigid body modes
(translation and rotation) and the first six bending modes.
The kth sensor Yk is located at E k , and from equation (3.3)
00
Yk( t) =	 OPO V40
	 (3.5)
i=1
Equations (3.5) and (3.4) can be put into a state space representation by defining
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Mode #
Modal
frequency
rad/sec x=0.5 ft
Mode shape
x=2.5 ft
values at
x=6.0 ft x=9.5 ft
1 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
2 0 -1.590 -1.010 0.000 1.010
3 11.418 -1.600 -0.123 1.210 -0.123
4 31.360 1.320 -0.876 0.000 0.876
5 61.258 1.040 -1.300 1.410 - L300
6 100.900 -0.753 1.090 0.000 -1.000
7 150.185 -0.465 0.356 1.400 0.356
8 209.004 -0.181 -0.553 0.000 0.553
Table 3-I: Modal Frequencies and Normalized
Mode Shapes (taken from reference [41)
the control vector
UT = u l u2 u3 u 4 J
the measurement vector
Y  
= l y l y2 y3 y4 l
and the state vector
XT = [ 10 1 IP 1
 'P2 'P2 . . . ON 'PN; I
Then, the state space representation of the beam model is
t (t) = A x(t) + B u(t) 	 (3.6)
Y(t) = C x(t)
where
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i
0	 1
i
-wi	 0 .
0 1
	 0
A =1	 -w2 0
0	
0 1
i -wN 0
i
0	 0	 0	 0
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02(El)
02((2)
02(E3)
02((4)
0	 ON(E1)	 0
0	 ON(E2)	 0
0	 0N(E3)	 0
0	 ON((4)
	
0
where E 1 = 0.5 ft., E2 = 2.5 ft., E3 = 6.0 ft. and E4 = 9.5 ft., and N is the number
of modes included in the model.
The block diagonal structure of matrix A results from the zero coupling
between the modes, which in turn, is due to the lack of damping in the beam. The
structure of matrices B and C correspond to having fore actuators and deflection
sensors respectively. It is important to note that any flexible structure with
negligible damping having force actuators and- displacement sensors, will be
describe. by a state model with matrices A, B and C of the same structure as the
ones corresponding to the beam. Therefore, most of the results obtained in this
thesis can be applied to most flexible space structures.
3.2 Filter Design for Actuator Failure Events
The actuator failure model was described in section 2.1 and is given by
equation (2.5). The event vector f associated with the failure of actuator j is equal
to b,, the jth column of matrix B:
f = b^	 j = 1, 2, 3, 4
Let's first consider the design of a failure detection filter to detect and
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identify the four actuator failure events. Applying the definition of output
separability given in section 2.3.2, it was found that uj = 1 and that the events (
fl , f2, f3, f4 ) are output separable if and only if the number of modeled modes N is
equal to or larger than four: N > 4. The detection generator gj corresponding to
these events was found to be equal to f. , and the detection order equal to two for
any N > 1:
gj = fj = bj	j = 1, 2, 3, 4
vj = 2
The number of completion spaces is (rank C - r) . Then, since rank C = 4
and r = 4, there are no completion spaces, and, therefore the group detc-etion order
is equal to 2 X N, the number of filter states. Moreover, since the sum of the
individual detection orders j is 8, it can be concluded from the group detection
theorem that the events t f l , f2, f3, f4 } are mutually detectable if N = 4. If N >
4, the set of four actuator failure events wii; not be mutually detectable, but the
set of any combination of up to three of these events will be.
A failure detection filter was designed to detect the failures of actuators
number 3 and 4. The design was made using the algorithms of Chapter 2 and was
based on a model of the beam containing the first 7 modes, resulting in a 14 state
filter. This design produced a state space partitioned in this way:
R'14=R3®R4ED910C2
where R. and R4 are the two dimensional detection spaces corresponding to
actuators number 3 and 4 respectively, and C l and C2 are six and four dimensional
completion spaces. In this first design, the 14 filter poles were rather arbitrarily
placed at -10 rad/sec. This filter is named Detection Filter #1.
A
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Detection Filter #1:
#of modes =7
failure events = Actuators 3 and 4
Poles:
4 detection space poles at -10 rad/sec
10 completion space poles at -10 rad/sec
3.3 Computer Simulations
In all the computer simulations, the system and filter start with zero initial
conditions at time 0 sec.. The controls applied by the actuators are randomly-
chosen command forces uniformly distributed between -1 and 1 pound, and held
constant during 1/32 seconds. The actuator failure occurs at t = 1 sec. and the
failure mode chosen is complete failure, that is ujt) = 0 or equivalently, q(t)
ujt) in equation (2.4).
j
The dynamics of the system and filter are simulated using a fifth order
Runge-Kutta integration routine. The step size is chosen automatically by this
routine, and is always smaller than 1/192 seconds. Therefore, since the period
the highest frequency mode being simulated is 1/33.2 seconds, the continuity of tl
system and filter dynamics is preserved.
The detection filter #1, described in the previous section, is first tested wit
no model mismatch (the evaluation model of the beam consists of the first.
structural modes.) When the actuators are operating nominally, the output error
zero. When actuator 3 fails, the output error lies in the direction CA" 3 f3 =
CAb3, and when actuator 4 fails, it lies in the direction CAN4 f4 = CAb 4
 (since 2
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= u4 = 1.) One way of reading this directionality information from the output, in
order to identify the failed actuator, is by transforming the output space:
E(t) = R E(t)
	 (3.i)
where E(t) is the four dimensional output error vector,
E(t) _ [ E3 E4 IT
is the two dimensional transformed output error vector, and
R = [(CF)T CF]-1 (CF)T
is the pseudoinverse (F is defined in section 2.3.2).
With no model mismatch and before the failure occurs, the output error E(t)
and transformed output error E(t) are both zero. When actuator 3 fails E(t)
CAb3 K(t) , where K(t) is a scalar time function. Therefore,
E(t) = R c(t) = R CAb3 K(t)
1
and since CAb3 = CF	 ,
0
then
1
E(t) _ [(CF)T CF ]-1 (CF)T CF	 K(t)
0
and
91
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Hence, when actuator 3 fails, E3 becomes nonzero and E4 remains zero. In a
similar way, it can be shown, when actuator 4 fails, E4 becomes nonzero and E3
remains zero.
Figure 3-2: Detection Filter #1. No model mismatch.
Actuator 3 failure at T = t sec.
These results were verified with simulations. Figure 3-2 shows the
transformed output error (E3 and E4) resulting from the simulation of the beam
and detection filter #1 with no model mismatch, and with the failure of actuator
number 3 at T = 1 sec.. The transformed output error is zero until T = 1 sec., at
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(3.8)
which point E3 starts growing, clearly indicating the failure of actuator number 3.
Figure 3-3 shows the results of the simulation with no model mismatch and with
N
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failure of actuator number 4 at T = 1 sec..
Figure 3-3: Uetec'ion Filter #1. No model mismatch.
Actuator 4 failure at T = 1 sec.
With no model mismatch, the detection filter #1 performed as expected,
producing evident signatures at the output indicating the failure of actuator
number 3 or 4. In the next chapter, the performance of this filter in the presence of
model misrr ,.tch will be analyzed.
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Chapter 4
Failure Detection with Model Mismatch
The best way of introducing the problem of failure detection in the presence
of model mismatch, is by showing the results of the simulations of Detection Filter
#1, introduced in the previous chapter, with mismatched evaluation models of the
beam. Model mismatch occurs in two forms: unmodeled dynamics resulting from
the truncation of the system model, and parameter errors in that portion of the
system dynamics that is being modeled.
In the flexible beam, unmodeled dynamics take the form of unmodeled high
frequency structural modes. Since the model of the flexible beam is essentially
infinitely dimensioned, the design of the detection filter is based on a reduced order
model of the beam. Then, those high frequency structural modes that have been
truncated from the model are the unmodeled modes.
To test the performance of the detection filter in the presence of unmodeled
modes, simulations are performed in which the evaluation model of the beam is of
higher o,-der than the model used in the filter design. For example, Detection Filter
#1, based on a 7 mode model, is tested with an 8 mode evaluation model of the
beam. Hence, in this simulation the eighth structural mode, with a frequency of
209.004 rad/sec., is the unmodeled mode. All the system modes, including the
unmodeled one, are given zero initial conditions at T = 0 sec., and since the real
physical beam has some damping, this is not an unrealistic assumption. Also, in
order to highlight the effect of model mismatch, neither sensor noise nor
disturbance is simulated throughout this thesis.
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The result of the simulation of Detection Filter #1, with an 8 mode
evaluation model of the system, and with failure of actuator 4 at T = 1 sec.,	 is
shown in Figure 4-1.	 The residual due to the unmodeled dynamics (the eighth
structural mode) completely obscures the signature of the actuator failure (see also
Fig. 3-3). Strikingly, this residual has a low frequency character rather than the
frequency of the unmodeled bending mode.
Figure 4-1: Detection Filter #1. Eighth Mode is Unmodeled.
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
The parameter errors in the model of the flexible beam are the errors in the
calculated values of the frequencies and shapes of the structural modes. That is,
they are the errors in the figures of Table 3-1. Since the model frequencies and
shapes depend on the physical characeristics of the beam, the errors in these
quantities are correlated. However, when testing the performance of detection
filters in the presence of parameter uncertainties percentage errors are introduced
in the parameters of the evaluation model in a random manner with a uniform
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distribution. For example, when considering parameter uncertainties of 5%, the
percentage errors in the natural frequencies and shapes of the modes are uniformly
distributed between -5% and +5%.
The errors in each of the matrices A, B and C, resulting from the errors in
the knowledge of the modal frequencies and shapes, affect the performance of the
detection filter in different ways. Therefore, in order to gain a better
understanding of the problem, the detection filters are tested with parameter
uncertainties in only one of the matrices A, B or C. In all cases, the detection filters
are designed using the values of Table 34, and tested with parameter uncertainties
by introducing errors in the matrices A, B and/or C of the evaluation model of the
beam.
The result of the simulation of r etection Filter #1 with 0.05% parameter
uncertainties in the system matrix A (modal frequencies), and with failure of
actuator 4 at T = 1 sec., is shown in Fig. 4-2. Notice that the noise due to the
parameter errors is larger than the failure signature, even though the level of
parameter uncertainties is extremely low.
Figure 4-3 shows that the result of the simulation of Detection Filter #1 with
0.05% parameter uncertainties in the control matrix B, and with failure of actuator
4 at T = 1 sec.. The result of this simulation is even more surprising than the
preceding ones. The residual due to errors smaller than 0.05% in the control
matrix B, is of the same magnitude as the residual due to the complete failure of
actuator 4 !
Finally, Fig. 4-4 shows the result of the simulation of Detection Filter #1
with 0.05% parameter uncertainties in the measurement matrix C, and with failure
of actuator 4 at T = 1 sec.. It can be seen that the residual due to the parameter
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Figure 42: Detection Filter #1. Parameter Uncertainties in Matrix A = 0.05 %.
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figure 43: Detection Filter #1. Parameter Uncertainties in Matrix B = 0.050.
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
errors in matrix C, is two orders of magnitude larger than the failure signatures. In
-so-
addition, notice the very low frequency character of this residual. It seems so far
that the errors in the measurement matrix C are the most critical ones.
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Figure 4-4: Detection Filter #1. Parameter Uncertainties in Matrix C = 0.05°0.
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
Figures 4-1 through 4-4 dramatically illustrate the effects of model mismatch
on the performance of the detection filter. Even with extremely low model
uncertainties and high frequency unmodeled modes, the residual due to model
errors makes the failure signature indistinguishable.
The objective in this chapter is to improve the visibility of the failure
signature in the presence of model errors. To meet this objective, first the different
dynamics associated with this problem are described. A frequency domain analysis
that will lead to a more intelligent choice of the filter pole locations then follows.
Finally, an approach to the design of robust detection filters based on low order
models of the beam and output filtering, is presented.
U 
u2
U3
U4
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4.1 Detection Filter Dynamics
In order to understand the reason for the poor results shown in Fig. 4-1
through 4-4, different aspects of the dynamics o! detection filters are discussed in
this section. Most of these results, however, are only valid when the plant is an
undamped flexible structure, with a state model representation given by the
matrices A, B and C described in Chapter 3.
4.1.1 Structura: Mode Dynamics
The modal amplitude 0 ,4t) of the A mode, is given by equation (4.4) where
the term to the right of the equal sign will be referred to as z 1 The block diagram
corresponding to this equation is shown in Fig. 4-5
W.
Figure 4-5: Structural Mode Dynamics
The transfer function from z i
 to Oi is
A • a
GTt (s) = ` _
z i (s)	 s2+wti
and the Bode plot of the frequency response T,4jw) is given in Fig. 4-6.
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(4.1)
Figure 4-6: Modal Frequency Response
Note in Fig. 4-6, that the frequency response of the mode approaches 1/—,2
the frequency tends to zero.
4.1.2 Detection Space Dynamics
Given a detection filter configured to detect the failure event f, Beard showed
that when event If occurs, the Laplace transform of the output error is:
c(s) = CA" f H(s) i7 (s)	 (4.2)
	
svf
-u-I + av 	 svf'u-2 _}	 + aIH(s) =	 f	 —
svf + p
vf 
svf' I
 +	 + pl
—Ja3-
where the zeros of the denominator polynomial are the poles of the det-etion filter
associated with the detection space Rr , and the ad 's were defined in equation
(2.19) .
From equation (4.2), it can be concluded that the transfer from q(s) to c(s)
depends only on the dynamics associated with the detection spare Rr. This result
is not surprising, since R, is an invariant space and If c R,. Also note that while the
designer has complete control over the denominator of H(s), by choosing the
detection space poles, he cannot alter the numerator.
These results can be specialized to the problem of detecting the failure of an
actuator in the flexible beam. It was found, for actuator failure events, that u = 1.
vt = 2 and g = f (equivalently a l = 1). In particular, for Detection Filter #1
(with all detection space poles at -10 rad/sec.) and complete failure of actuator :;
(17(t) = u 4 (t) ) equation (4.2) becomes
c(s) = CAb4 H4(s) u4(s)	 (4.3)
where
1
H4(s)=s2+20s+100
Moreover, since the tra:.siormed output error is
E(s) = R c(s) = R CAb 4 H4(s) u4 (s)
and
r
0
R CAb4
1
then
E4( S) = H4( S ) u4(S)
The Bode plot of the frequency response H4(jw), corresponding to Detection
Filter #1, is given in Fig. 4-7.
Figure 4-7: Detection Space Transfer
4.1.3 Model Error Dynamics
In this subsection, models for the different types of model mismatch are
developed.	 These models are the basis for the frequency response analysis
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(4.4)
performed in the next section, that will help explain the very large residuals
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produced by " very small" modeling errors.
In all the following cases of model mismatch, the state and output equations
[L
F
of the filter are the same as before, and for convenience are repeated here:
	
X(t)- AX(t)+Bu. (t)+D(y(t)-Y(t)]	 (4.5)
y(t)-CX(t)
where the matrices A, B and C were defined in the previous chapter for N modes.
First, the case in which the system has more than N modes (this will always be the
case for flexible structures) is analyzed. Then, three cases are analyzed in which
only one of the matrices A, B or C contain errors and the other two are exact.
Finally, the real situation in which the three matrices contain errors is considered.
r	 4.1.3.1 Unmodeled Modes
Suppose that N is the number of structural modes that are modeled in the
design of the detection filter. Then, the state and output equations for the beam
can be written as
*	 I A 0x	 B
	
+	 u
i	 0	 Au	 Xu	 Pe..
Y = C Cu x
x
u
r
where the matrices A, B and C correspond to the modeled part of the system
ti
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dynamics, and A u, B u and C u correspond to the unmodeled part. The state and
outp;a n;uationsi for the filter are exa(% tly the same as before (Equation (4.5)).
Therefore, the new state and output error equations are:
6(t) = (A - DC) e(t) - DC x,, (t)
E(t)= Ce(t)+C u x u (t)	 (4.6)
where
$ u (t) =A u x u (t) +Euu(t)
The poles of the filter are still given by the eigenvalues of (A - DC), and therefore,
the presence of unmodeled modes does, not affect the stability of the filter. They
do, however, impair the detecton capabilities of the filter, by generating a residual
that obscures the failure signature.
For the sake of clarity, equation (4.6) is written as
00
6(t) = (A - DC) e(t) - D E C i Ot (t)
i=N+ 1
where
^i{E1)
^,{E2)
C^
►^ j{E3)
ul
U9
u3
u4
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and where tpi ( t) is the amplitude of an unmodeled mode.
Figure 4-8: Unmodeled Modes Error Dynamics
Figure 4-8 shows a block diagram representation of equation (4.7). The actuators
drive the unmodeled modes in the same way shown in the block diagram of Fig.
4-5. The unmodeled modes amplitudes tpN+1 , ON+2' ,then generate an output
residual through two different paths: a direct path through the vectors ci, and an
indirect path by driving the state error equations through the "control vector" Dci.
Note that while the designer has no control over the direct path , he has "some"
control on the indirect path by adjusting the filter pole locations with the gain
matrix D. However, since D must be a detector gain, and is in both the feedback
loop (A - DC) and the control vector Dc i , this is not a trivial problem.
4.1.3.2 Parameter Errors in A
The parameters of the system matrix A are the modal natural frequencies.
The true modal frequencies are called wi, and the true system matrix is called A*.
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Hence, if w i and A are the modal frequencies and the system matrix used in the
filter design, define:
^
Gw2 = wi 
*2_ 
w	 (4.81
AA=A^-A
and, therefore,
AA =1
0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Awi
0	 0
Owl
0
0
0 0 0 0	 0 AW2 0
Hence, the state and output equations for the system are now:
*(t) = (A + Z^A) x(t) + B u(t)
Y(t) = C x(t)	 (4.9)
Combining these equations with the equations of the filter (Eq. (4.5)), the new state
and output error equations are:
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6(t) _ (A - DC) e(t) + AA x(t)
E(t) = C e(t)	 ( 4.10)
i
These equations can also be written as:
N
6(t) — (A - DC) e(t) +
	
,tai 
'Pi (t)
i=1
F(t) = C e(t) (4.11)
where
0
0
Aai — Aw i
 6N(2 x sj	
Awi
0
0
The block diagram representing the equation (4.11) is illustrated in Fig. 4-0.
From Eq. (4.11) or Fig. 4-9, notice that the modal amplitudes 
^li drive the
state error through the "control vector" Aa i , thus gencrating a residual at the
output. This error model is similar to the error model for actuator failures, but
with tP i and Lai in place of u i and bi.
-so-
0.
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Figure 4-9: Error Dynamics for Model Error in A
4.1.3.3 Parameter Errors in B
The parameters of the control matrix B are the values of the mode shapes at
the actuator locations. The true control matrix is B i , and the control matrix used
in the filter design is B. Define the difference between these two matrices as:
AB =B`-B
where
ilB = [ Ab l Ab2 vb3 Ab4
Therefore, the system state and output equations are now:
X(t) = A x(t) + (B + AB) u(t)	 (4.12)
U 
U2
U3
u4
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y(t) = C x(t)
and, combining them with the filter equations, get the new state and output error
equations-
4
6(t) =(A- DC) e(t) + 	 Abiui
i=1	 (4.13)
E(t) — C e(t)
These equations are represented in a block diagram form in Fig. 4-10.
Figure 410: Error Dynamics for Model Error in B.
From Eq. (4.13) and Fig. 4-10, it can be noted that this error model is the
same as the error model for actuator failures but with Ab i instead of bi
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4.1.3.4 Parameter Errors in C
The parameters of the measurement matrix C are the values of the mode
shapes at the sensor locations. Define C i as the true measurement matrix. The
difference between C ` and C (the measurement matrix used in the filter design), is
defined as:
AC=C+ -C
where
AC = [ AC, AC 2 . . . AC NI
Then, the state and output system equations are:
1(t) == Ax(t) + B u(t)	 (4.14)
y(t)=(C+AC)x(t)
and the new state and output error equations are:
N
6(t) = (A - DC) e(t) - D	 Acitii(t)	 (4.15)
i=1
N
c(t) = C e(t) +
	
Aci ip i (t)
i=1
In Fig. 4-11, the block diagram representation of Eq. 4-15 is shown. It is important
to note that this error model is similar to the error model for unmodeled modes
(Fig. 4-8). The main difference is that while the state error -in Eq. (4.15) is driven
by the amplitude of the modeled structural modes, the state error in Eq. (4.7) is
u 
u2
U3
u4
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driven by the amplitude of the unmodeled ones. The other difference is in the
vector multiplying the modal amplitudes: in Eq. (4.15) this vector is Ac t, and in
Eq. (4.7) is C;
Figure 4-11: Error Dynamics for Model Error in C
4.1.3.5 Parameter Errors in A, B and C
In the real problem, all the matrices A, B and C contain errors. This problem
can be analyzed by dividing it into the three cases explained in the three previous
subsections, and then adding the output resid!ials obtained in each case. However,
in order for the superposition principle to apply, a modification must be introduced
when dividing the problem into the three cases illustrated in Figures 4 .9, 4-10 and
4-11: the modal amplitudes V) ; in Fig. 4-9 and 4-11 must be generated by the true
beam model, with the true system matrix A * and the true control matrix B*
instead of the matrices A and B used in the filter design.
The modal amplitudes obtained with A* and B* , however, are not different in
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character than the ones obtained with A and B (for practical values of parameter
errors). Moreover, the reasons for the extremely large residuals when there are
parameter errors in the model, lie on the transfers from the modal amplitudes ?^, to
the output E(t) in Fig. 4-9 and Fig. 4-11, and on the transfers from the control
inputs u  to the output E(t) in Fig. 4-10. Therefore, the problem of parameter
errors in the matrices A, B and C can be analyzed by dividing the problem into
three cases in which only one of the matrices contains errors and the other two are
exact. This is the approach taken in this thesis.
4.2 Frequency Response Analysis
The reasons for the poor performance exhibited by Uetecton Filter #1 in the
presence of model mismatch, can be explained by conducting a frequency response
analysis, based on the error models developed in the previous section.
From Eq. (4.1), it can be concluded that the higher the natural frequency of
the structural mode, the lower the amplitude transfer at low frequencies.
Therefore, since the unmodeled mode (the eight structural mode) is a very high
frequency mode, its amplitude has very small low frequency components, and most
of its energy is at its natural frequency. However, Fig. 4-1 shows, very
surprisingly, that the unmodeled mode produced a residual with a low frequency
character rather than the high frequency of the unmodeled bending mode.
The reason for this residual behavior can be explained in terms of the
frequency response functions for the transfer from the amplitude of the eight mode
g to the residuals E3 and E 4 (see Fig. 4-8). These frequency response functions
are shown in Fig. 4-12, where the extremely high amplitude transfer at low
frequencies can be noted. This very large gain at low frequencies amplifies the
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small low frequency components of the unmodeled mode excitation, giving the
residuals of Fig. 4-1 a low frequency character.
A simple calculation can show that the low frequency gains in Fig. 4-12 result
in an unfavorable signal to noise ratio. This calculation is only an approximation
and is based on the assumption that actuator 4, the one that fails at T = 1 sec., is
the only active actuator. Under this assumption, the low frequency gain for the
transfer from u 4 to tPg can be computed as:
1tP8 1
	
b8	 1.102	 5
= 2.522 X 10'	 for w 0
1 u4 1 W28
where b8 
= 08 ((4) / M (see Fig. 4-5). The low frequency gain for the transfer from
'P8 to E4 can be obtained from Fig. 4-12:
IE41 
= 2070	 for w ^ 0
1'81
Therefore, the ratio I E4 1 / I u 4 1 is calculated as:
Hp = 1 41 = 2 .522 X 10-5 X 2070 = 0.052	 for w ^ 0
Iu41
This ratio corresponds to the noise present at the residual E 4 , due to the
unmodeled mode. The ratio corresponding to the signature produced by the failure
of actuator 4 is, from equations (4.3) and (4.4):
10
M,
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E
H = ¢ = 0.01 for w ,^ 0
s	
^u4^
Therefore, the low frequency signal to noise ratio at E4 is Hs/lIn = 1/5.2. This
unfavorable signal to noise ratio explains why low frequency noise obscured
completely the failure signature in Fig. 4-1.
In the real experiment, the four actuators are active. In this case, it is
reasonable to expect the modal amplitude V'8 to be larger than the one resulting
from only one actuator. Consequently, a larger noise at E 4 is also expected. The
failure signature, however, remains the same because it depends only on actuator 1.
Therefore, it is likely in the real experiment, for the signal to noise ratio to be
worse than 1/5.2.
The results Fhown in Fig. 4-12 were very unexpected. A detection filter is a
linear observer whose gain matrix D has the additional constraint, besides making
the filter stable, of restricting the output error due to a particular failure to a
single line in the output space. The typical behavior of a linear observer is: 1) to
follow the measurement noise when its frequency lies inside the bandwidth of the
filter, and 2) not to respond to the measurement noise when its frequency is higher
than the filter bandwidth, thus resulting in large residuals. Translated into the
frequency domain, this means that the frequency response of the transfer from the
measurement noise to the residual is expected to be very small within the
bandwidth of the filter, and then grow to a certain. value at higher frequencies.
Detection Filter #1 behaved as expected at frequencies higher than 10 rad/sec b}
responding moderately to the unmodeled mode noise. However, it behaved quire
differently than expected at low frequencies, by actually amplifying the unmodeled
mode noise, as can be seen in Fig. 4-12. It seems that the directionality constraint.
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Figure 4-12: Detection rilter #1. Unmodeled Mode Transfer
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combined with the dynamics of the flexible beam, resulted in a detection filter that
is a very poor observer when all of its poles are placed at -10 rad/sec.
The results of testing Detection Filter #1 with 0.05% parameter
uncertainties in systfm matrix A, can be seen in Fi- r. 4-2. Note that the residual
that obscures the failure signature has the frequency of the first bending mode.
The error dynamics for the case of parameter errors in A is shown in Fig. 4-9. The
vectors Dal and Aa, are zero because they correspond to the rigid modes, whose
frequencies are known to be exactly zero. Of the bending modes, the first one, with
a frequency of 11 rad/sec, comes the closest to lying within the bandwidth of the
filter. Therefore, since the contributions from the higher bending modes are
filtered out, the residuals have the frequency of the first bending mode. Figure
4-13 shows the frequency response of the transfer from0 3 to the residuals E3 and
E4.
When testing Detection Filter #1 with parameter uncertainties, the most
surprising result was obtained when considering parameter errors in matrix B. The
residuals produced by parameter errors smaller than 0.05 o in the contirol matrix B,
were of the same magnitude as the signature resulting from the complete failure of
actuator 4 (See Fig. 4-3).
As can be seen in Fig. x-10, the reason for these large residuals must lie in the
transfers from the coWru ► imputs u s to the residuals E3 and E4 . The frequency
response functions for the transfer from the control u 4 to the residuals E3
 and E4
are shown in Fig. 4-14. The values of these functions at low frequency are O.0065
for E3 and 0.011 for E4 . Therefore, since the low frequency gain corresponding to
failure of actuator 4 is 0.01, the residuals and the failure signature are of the same
magnitude.
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Figure 4-13: Detection Filter #1. .Parameter Errors in A = 0.05 %.
Transfer from y3 to E3 and E4.
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It is interesting to note that even though the elements of the vector Ab 4 are
smaller than 0.050/76 of the respective elements in b 4 , the amplitude transfer from 114
to E4 is actually a little larger with Ob4 than with b4 as the control vector in h ig.
4-10. However, this would not be the case if Ob4 lay in the same direction in the
state space as b4. For example, if the error in each element of b 4 were +0.05"—,-,
then Ab4 = 0.0005 X b4 and the gain corresponding to Ab4 would be 0.05 0 of
the gain corresponding to b 4 (i.e., 0.0005 X 0.01 = 5 X 10-6 ).
Since the dynamics of both detection spaces are the same, then the large low.
frequency gains that result when Ab 4 does not lie in the same direction as b 4 must
be due to the dynamics of the completion spaces.
The test of Detection Filter #1 with 0.05% parameter uncertainties in the
measurement matrix C, produced the results shown in Fig. 4-4. The residuals have
a very low frequency character and appear to be unbounded.
The error model for the case of parameter errors in C, is shown in Fig. 4-11.
As mentioned earlier, it is similar to the error model for unmodeled triodes. Figure
4-15 shows the frequency response functions for the transfer from the modal
amplitude V1 to the residuals E3 and E4 . The low frequency gains are almost three
orders of magnitude smaller than those corresponding to the transfer from the
unmodeled mode 1P8 to the residuals E3 and E.t . The reason for this is that the
vector Oc l is much smaller than the vector c$.
The beam is being driven by the actuators in an open loop manner.
Therefore, the amplitude of the rigid modes 0, and ^ since their poles are at, the
origin, start to increase and become unbounded. That is, the beam moves away
from the reference and starts to rotate. Therefore, even though the low frequency
transfer from 01 and 'VZ to E is relatively small, since the modal amplitudes ^,, and
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Figure 4-14: Detection Filter #1. Parameter Errors in B = 0.05'o.
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0, are growing with no bounds, eventually ip i and 02 become large enough to
generate residuals that obscure the failure signature. This explains the very low
frequency and the unbounded nature of the residuals in Fig. 4-4.
To summarize, the reasons for the poor performance of Detection Filter #1 in
the presence of model mismatch were explained in terms of frequency response
functions (Fig. 4-12 through 4-15). It was found that these frequency responses had
features that were very unexpected, like very large low frequency gains.
It is believed that the "strange" transfer properties of Detection Filter #1 are
the result of applying the directionality constraints to the dynamics of flexible
structures. The question now is whether a different choice of filter pole locations
would improve these transfer properties and the performance of the filter.
It is reasonable to expect that by increasing the bandwidth of the filter. by
moving the filter poles further to the left in the s - plane, the filter's ability to
track the measurement vector y(t) will improve, thus resulting in smaller erro,
residuals. This would be true for both detection space and completion space poles.
However, since moving the detection space poles to the left also reduces the size of
the failure signature (Eq. (4.2)), it is not clear whether this would result in a better
signal to noise ratio. Conversely, since the failure signature does not depend on the
completion space poles, moving these poles to the left cou'd result in a better signal
to noise ratio.
To test this hypothesis, a detection filter was designed with the same
detection space poles, but with the completion space poles moved to -100 rad/sec.
Detection Filter #2:
#of modes =7
failure events = Actuators 3 and 4
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Poles:
4 detection space poles at -10 rad/sec
10 completion space poles at -100 rad/sec
Since the location of the detection space poles was not changed, the
signatures for the failure of actuators 3 and 4 remained the same as before, and are
shown in Fig. 3-2 and 3-3.
For the remainder of this section, Detection Filter #2 will be subject to the
same frequency response analysis and will be simulated under the same conditions
as Detection Filter #1.
Figure 4-16 shows the frequency response functions for the transfer from the
unmodeled mode 08 to the residuals E3 and E4, for Detection Filter #2. Note the
dramatic decrease in the low frequency gain.
The improved transfer properties of Detection Filter #2 suggest that it
should perform much better than Filter #1 in the presence of unmodeled dynamics.
This is shown to be the case in Fig. 4-17, where Detection Filter #2 is tested in the
presence of the unmodeled eight mode. The residuals no longer have a low
frequency character, and the frequency of the bending mode is evident. More
importantly, the signature of the failure of actuator 4 at 1 sec. is clearly visible.
Figure 4-18 shows that there has also been a dramatic improvement in the
transfer corresponding to the case of parameter errors in
The results of the simulation of Detection Filter #2 with 0.05 o parameter
uncertainties in A, are shown in Fig. 4-19. The large improvements in the transfer
properties are reflected in these results, where the failure signature now is clearly
visible. The bias in the residuals has vanished and the frequency of the first
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Figure 4-16: Detection Filter #?. Unmode!ed Mode Transfer
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Figure 4-17: Detection Filter #2. Eighth Mode is Unmodeled.
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
bending mode is barely noticeable. Now, the frequency of the second bending mode
becomes evident.
Notice that the errors in the modal frequencies of the third, fourth and fifth
bending modes do not produce any noticeable effects in the residuals. The reason
for this desirable result is that the frequencies of these bending modes fie outside
the bandwidth of the filter, and therefore, they are filtered out. Since the
uncertainty in the knowledge of the modal frequencies increases the higher these
frequencies are, this result is very important.
Figure 4-20 shows the residuals produced by the simulation of Detection
Filter #2 with 1% parameter uncertainty in matrix A. The failure signature is
completely obscured by the residuals, and therefore, it can be concluded that the
improved filter cannot perform adequately with uncertainties equal or larger than
1% in the knowledge of the modal frequencies.
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Figure 4-20: Detection Filter #2. Parameter Errors in Matrix A = loo.
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
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Detection Filter #2 also showed a remarkable improvement in performance:
I ' when tested in the presence of parameter uncertainties in B. The frequency
response functions related to this case are shown in Fig. 421. The low frequency
gains are two orders of magnitude smaller than Oe gain corresponding to Detection
Filter #1.
The results of the simulation of Detection Filter #2 with 0.05% parameter
uncertainties in B, can be seen in Fig. 422. The improvement is remarkable. The
residuals due to model mismatch are barely noticeable. However, the improved
filter is still not good enough to detect failures in the presence of more realistic
levels of parameter uncertainties. The filter was tested with 5% parameter
uncertainties in B, and the signature was completely obscured by the residual (Fig.
423).
Finally, Detection Filter #2 was tested with parameter uncertainties in the
measurement matrix C. Its transfer properties are shown in Fig. 4-24, where a large
improvement can also be noted. The simulation. shown in Fig. 4-25 gave much
better results as well. However, the improvements were not large enough to make
the failure signature clearly visible.
To summarize, dramatic improvements have been accomplished by moving
the completion space poles further to the left in the s - plane. The largest
improvements were obtained in the performance of the filter in the presence of
unmodeled modes and parameter errors in B. The improved filter is able to detect
failures with almost 5%  parameter uncertainties in B.
Even though the improvements in the performance of the filter with model
I '	 errors in A and C were also remarkable, the filter would not tolerate par:uneter
errors in A of up to 1%, and in the case of system matrix C, the improvements
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Figure 4-25: Detection Filter #2. Parameter Errors in C = 0.05 0.
Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec.
were not enough to allow successful detection with 0.05%" parameter uncertainties.
However, the reasons for this disappointing performance may lie in part on
the somewhat unrealistic conditions under which the filter was tested. In the case
of parameter errors in A, the state error was driven mainly by the very large
components of the modal amplitudes at their natural frequencies resulting from the
lack of damping in the beam. The real beam, however, has some damping and
therefore these components would be considerably smaller. In addition, all the
modal amplitudes are kept small by the action of i,he control system during its
nominal operation. In the case of parameter errors in C, the state error was driven
by the unbounded amplitudes of the rigid modes corresponding to the drifting and
rotation of the beam. In the real problem, however, the control system would
prevent the beam from drifting and rotating.
It is also worth noting that the performance of the detection filter with
I
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parameter errors in A could be improved by filtering the output. Figure 4-20 shows
that the error residuals have a very large component at the frequency of the second
bending mode (31.36 rad/sec.). Therefore, since the bandwidth of the failure
signature is 10 rad/sec., the performance of Detection Filter #2 could be improved
by filtering E3 and E4 with a bandwidth of 10 rad/sec. .
Finally, something should be said about the placement of the detectors space
poles. unlike the case of the completion space poles, the choice of the locations of
the detection space poles strongly depends on the frequency content of the control
signals. It is clear that moving these poles to the left in the s - plane reduces the
residuals due to model mismatch and reduces the failure signature as well.
However, whether the signal to noise ratio improves or not will depend, among
other things, on the frequency content of the control inputs. The same is true
when considering the damping associated with these poles. Therefore, the choice of
the location of the detection space poles should be made on the basis of more
realistic simulations which include the control system along with the disturbances
of the beam. Moreover, a consideration to be taken into account when choosing
these poles is the response time of the detection filter.
4.3 Reduced Order Detection i ilters
In Chapter 3, it was shown that detection filters based on a model of the
beam with more than 4 structural modes (the number of sensors) could not be
configured to detect mole than three actuator failure events. Moreover, the design
of these filters was made very difficult by the presence of completion spaces, and
the specification of the filter poles did not result in a unique gain matrix
D. Another disadvantage of these filters, as shown by Detecton Filters #1 and #2,
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was their very complex dynamics. Their robust properties varied dramatically with
the location of the completion space poles, and even the improved filter ( Detection
Filter #2) could not tolerate realistic levels of parameter uncertainties.
This section analyzes the design and performance of detection filters based on
a model of the beam containing as many structural modes as the number of
displacement sensors p, and with all of its poles placed in the same location. it will
be shown that these filters do not have the disadvantages mentioned above. Also,
ways of coping with the larger number of unmodeled modes will be discussed, along
with the effects of using a reduced order model upon the detection and
identification capabilities of the filter.
4.3.1 Detection Filters with N = p
Let's consider the design of a detection filter based on a model of the beam
with p structural modes, where p is the number of independent displacement
measurements. That is,
N = p = # of sensors = rank C
Define the p X p matrix M as:
M—^c l Cl) . . . cp1
where c i is the column of matrix C corresponding to the amplitude of the ith
structural mode. It will be assumed that rank M = p, and therefore, M is
nonsingular. If this is not the case, the number of sensors used in the detection
filter should be reduced until rank M = P.
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In order to simplify both the filter design and the analysis that will follow, a
transformation is performed on the measurement vector y:
y+ = M-1 y
then,
y+=M-1Cx
and
y+=C+x
where
C+ =M-1 C
-
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0	 . .	 . 0
• 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
From the structure of C + , it is easy to verify that
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'P2
Y+ 	 (4.16)
'PN
Figure 4-26 shows the new block diagram of the failure detection filter which
i
	 incorporates the measurement transformation M" 1 . Notice that the detection filter
now uses the transformed measurement matrix C + . Also, it is easy to show that:
D=D+M-i
(=ME +
S
The state and output error equations corresponding to the failure of the jth
actuator are:
6(t) = ( A - D + C+ ) e(t) + bi q(t)	 (4.17)
E+ (t) = C+
 e(t)
where the vector b^ has the structure:
bjT = I 0 bJl 0 bj-2 ... 0 bjN 1	 (4.18)
Theorem 4.1 :
The gain matrix D+ that is a detector gain for all actuator failure events bj
and that assigns the filter poles as given by the roots of the equation
0=(sue+2^wFs+j
Y
u 
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Figure 4-26: The Failure Detection Filter with Output
Vector Transformation
is unique and given by:
n+ = I
di 0 0
0 d+ 0
' 0
0
0 0 0 d+
(4.19)
where
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dt=
	
2^wF
s
(wF - w? )
Proof:
First, calculate the matrix (A - D+ C+ ) as:
P
P
A - D+C+
0
0
P
(4.620)
where the 2 X 2 matrix P is:
-2^wF	1
P=
-caF	 0
The poles of the filter are given by the roots of the characteristic equation of the
matrix (A - D+ C+ ). That is, the roots of the equation
0 = det(s I - A + D+ C+ )
Since the matrix (A - D + C+ ) is block diagonal, using a result from linear algebra
get:
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det(sI-A+D+ C+ 	det(sI-P))N=(s2+ 2£wFs+w2)N
Therefore, the poles of the filter are given by the roots of the equation
0= (s2 +2CwFs +wF^N
as stated in the theorem.
To prove that the gain matrix D+ given in (4.19) is a detector gain for all
actuator failure events, the transfer function vector T ;
 (s) defined as
E+ ( s ) = T; ( s) rj(s)
Ti (s) =C+(sI-A+D+C+)-11i
is calculated. It is eas y to show that
Q
1 Q O(sI-A+D+ C +I —	 ,
11	 0	 .
Q
where
s	 1
1
Q=(sI-P)-1= 2	 X
S +2^WFs+wF
-wF	 s + 2 SwF
Then, by premultiplying by C + and postmultiplying by b  obtain:
(4.21)
I -.A
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bjl
b j2
X
b1N
Tj (s) = 1
s2 + 2^WF s + WF
where bjl , bj2 , . . . , b,,,,are the elements of the event vector bj in (4.18). Finally,
by defining the vector b1 as:
bjl
b+— bj2	 (4.22)
bJN
equation (4.21) can be written
(+ (s) = bl 2
	
Os)	 (4.23)
s A- 2^WF s + WF
Then, it can be concluded that when the jth actuator fails, the output error c+
remains in the single direction given by the vector b+ Therefore, since the event.
vector b  represents any actuator failure, the matrix D+ in (4.19) is a detector gain
for all actuator failure events, and the proof is complete. 	 v
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As it was shown in Theorem 4.1, the design of the detection filters being considered
in this section is trivial. The gain matrix D, in the filter implementation without
the transformation, (Fig. 2-1), can be obtained as D = D + M-1 . This gain matrix D
is a detector gain for all actuator failure events as well, and the output error (
remains in the direction CAb^ when the jth actuator fails.
5o far, two important advantages of detection filters with N = p over higher
order filters have been shown: 1) these filters can be configured to detect all
actuator failure events, and 2) the filter design is trivial. Now, their performance
in the presence of model mismatch will be analyzed.
A detection filter with N = p = 4 was designed using Theorem 4.1 with all
of its poles placed at -10 rad/sec (i.e., w F = 10 rad/sec and ^ = 1). This detection
filter was named Detection Filter #3.
Detection Filter #3-.
# of modes = # of sensors = 4
failure events: all actuator failures
Poles: 8 detection space poles at -10 rad/sec
To be able to compare the performance of this filter with the performance of
Detection Filters # 1 and #2, the output E is transformed with the pseudo inverse
matrix R to detect only failures of actuators 3 and 4, as was done with the previous
filters. That is, the matrix R in Fig. 4-26 is the pseudo inverse of the matrix CF:
R = [(CF) T CF 1-1 (CF )T	 (4.24)
where
CF = [CAb3 CAb4 1
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Since the detection space poles of Detection Filter #3 are the same as in
Filters # 1 and #2, and since the transfer function from u 4 to E4 (for complete
failure of actuator 4) is still given by Eq. (4.4), the failure signature produced by the
complete failure of actuator 4 is exactly the same as in Fig. 3-3.
It is easy to see that Detection Filter #3 is going to perform much better in
the presence of parameter errors in control matrix B than Filters #2 and #1. The
vectors Abp in Fig. 4-10 have the same structure as the actuator failure events b^
in (4.18).	 Therefore, the vectors Abp generate unidirectional error residuals
governed by Eq. ( 4.3) with Abp and u  in place of b4 and u4 . This means that the
error residual generated by Obi , when compared with the signature produced by
bi , is of the same order as the percentage errors in b^ . In other words, there is no
direction-dependent amplification of Abp as in Filters #1 and #2.
Figure 4-27 shows the frequency response functions for the transfer from 11 4 to
the residuals E3 and E4 , corresponding to 0.05% parameter errors in B. The low
frequency gains are two c. iers of magnitude smaller than the gains for Detection
Filter #2 shown in Fig. 4-14. Therefore, Detection Filter #3 will perform much
better in the presence of parameter errors in B than Filters #1 and #2.
It is also reasonable to expect Detection Filter #3 to perform better in the
presence of parameter errors in system matrix A, for the same reasons it performed
better with parameter errors in B. The vector Da d in Fig, 4-9 also have the same
structure as the actuator failure events b^, and therefore also generate
unidirectional output through the dynamics of the detection spaces.
Figure 4-28 shows the response function of the transfer from the unmodeled
eighth mode to the residuals E3 and E4 . The low frequency gains are one order of
magnitude smaller than for Detection Filter #2 in Fig. 4-16. Therefore-, Detection
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Figure 427: Detection Filter #3. Parameter Errors in B = 0.05 0.
Transfer from u 4
 to E3
 and E4 . R = Pseudo Inverse.
Filter #3 will perform better in the presence of the unmodeled eighth mode than
Filter #2. But, on the other hand, the fifth, sixth and seventh structural modes
are unmodeled in Detection Filter #3, while they are modeled in Filter #2. In
addition, these unmodeled modes have smaller natural frequencies than the eighth
mode, and therefore, they are more excited. Hence, the problem of unmodeled
modes is more serious in Detection Filter #3 than in Detection Filter #`l.
Part of the problem of unmodeled dynamics in Detection Filter #3 can he
solved by output filtering. Since the natural frequencies of the unmodeled modes
are higher than the bandwidth of the filter (i.e., 10 rad/sec), by filtering the output
error E with a bandwidth of 10 rad/sec, the large components of the error residuals,
due to the natural frequencies of the unmodeled modes passing through the direct
path in Fig. 4-8, can be eliminated without affecting the failure sign:tture.
Therefore, the elements of the output error vector E were filtered by second order
filters with bandwidths of 10 rad/sec. .
Figure 4-29 shows the results of the simulation of Detection Filter #3 wita no
model mismatch, with failure of actuator 4 at T = I sec. and with output filtering.
Note that the failure signature is smaller than the failure signature produced with
no output filtering in Fig. 3-3. This difference could have been avoided by choosing
a slightly wider bandwidth for the output filters.
Detectiop Filter #3 was then tested in the presence of unmodeled dynamics.
Figure 4-30 shows the results of the simulation of Detection Filter #3 with an 8
mode evaluation model of the beam, with failure of actuator 4 at. T = 1 sec. and
with output filtering. The error residuals due to the f ::r unmodeled modes (the
fifth, sixth seventh and eighth structural modes) completely obscure the failure
signature. From the low frequency character of these error residuals, it can be
concluded that the output filter was successful in eliminating the high frequency
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Figure 429: Detection Filter #3. No Model Mismatch. Actuator 4 Failure at
T = 1 sec.. R =Pseudo Inverse. Output Filtering.
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Figure 4-30: Detection Filter #3. Four Unmodeled Modes. Actuator 4 Failure at
T = 1 sec.. R = Pseudo Inverse. Output Filtering.
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components corresponding to the modal frequencies passing through the direct
path. Then, the large error residuals are due to the low frequency components of
the unmodeled mode amplitudes that lie within the bandwidth of the filter, and
therefore, cannot be filtered out without affecting the failure signature.
In the next two sections, ways of improving the performance of Detection
Filter #3 in the presence of unmodeled modes will be introduced.
4.3.2 Improved Output Transformation
An impressive improvement in the performance of Detection Filter #3 in the
presence of model mismatch can be obtained by simply using a different output
transformation R. But before introducing the new transformation, an analysis of
the dynamics of the detection filter described in Theorem 4.1 is in order.
To simplify the analysis, only one unmodeled mode will be considered: the
eighth structural mode. Then, the state and output error equations are
6(t) _ ( A - D+ C+ ) e(t) - D+ cs 08 ( t)
E + (t) = C+ e(t) + cg V)8 ( t)	 (4.'25)
E(t) = M E + (t)
where
C 8 = 
M-1 c8
and c8 is the column of the measurement matrix C corresponding to the amplitude
of the eighth structural mode. Due to the structure of matrices A, D + and C+,
Eq.((4.25)) can be written as:
a
li = A i - di+ cT / ei - di+ csi P8
Ei = cT ei + c8i8
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i=1,2,...N
(4.26)
where
e. —
s —
A(Ip
i' 0i)
cT =[1 0]
0	 1
A.—
^ — _
0
and where di was defined in (4.19), csi is the A element of the vector c8 and c + is
the A element of the output error vector c + . The two elements of the vector ei
are the errors in the estimate of the amplitude of the A structural mode and the
error in the estimate of its rate of change. The block diagram corresponding to Eq.
(4.26) is shown in Fig. 4.31.
From Eq. (4.26) and Fig. 4-31, it can be concluded that the error dynamics of
the detection filter described in Theorem 4.1 are decoupled. That is, the detection
filter estimates the modal amplitude ip and its rate of change tP for each structural
mode separately. This decoupling is achieved in the following way. First, since the
number of modes is equal to the number of independent displacement
measurements, it is possible to calculate the modal amplitudes by transforming the
measurement vector y to yi as can be seen in (4.16). Second, the structure of the
008
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Figure 431: Decoupled Dynamics of Detection Filters with N = p.
gain matrix D+ in (4 . 19) applies the residual ip i - V) i to the corresponding A mode
(see Figure 4-26).
The decoupled dynamics of the detection filter described in Theorem 4.1 are
very easy to analyze. As can be seen in Fig. 4-31, the unmodeled modes can be
treated as disturbances in the decoupled loops corresponding to each of the
modeled modes. Then, the transfer from+ 8 to Ei can be easily obtained as:
( (s)	 s2 + w?
cgs 08(s)	 s2 + 2^ wF s + w22.
(4.27)
This transfer function is called the Disturbance Transfer. Figure 4-32 shows th,
Bode plots of the disturbance transfer for two modal frequencies ;
 one larger than
the bandwidth of the filter w F and the other smaller. Note that for wi > wF there
i,
E , `8 ► I
CRi
W' WF	 Wi	 W
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is actually an amplification of the unmodeled mode noise within the bandwidth of
the filter, while for ws < wF there is an attenuation.
Figure 4-32: Frequency Response of the Disturbance Transfer.
There are four structural modes modeled into Detection Filter #3, two rigid
modes and two bending modes. The rigid modes, with modal frequencies of 0
rad/sec., totally reject the unmodeled mode disturbance at low frequencies, because
the low frequency gain of the disturbance transfer is zero. On the other hand, the
bending modes with modal frequencies of 11.4 and 31.4 rad/sec. have disturbance
transfers with low frequency gains of 1.3 and 9.8 respectively. Therefore, the large
error residuals in Fig. 4-30 are due to the bending modes. Specifically, the presence
of the unmodeled modes generates neglectable low frequency errors in the residuals
Ei and E2 corresponding to the rigid modes, significant low frequency errors in the
residual E3 corresponding to the first bending mode and very large low frequency
,W
a	 .
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errors in the residual E4 corresponding to the second bending mede.
The output error vector E is calculated from e+ as E = M e + . Therefore, the
large residuals E3 and E4 produced by the unmodeled modes generate large
unidirectional errors in the directions of c3 and c4 , respectively, in the output space
of c. Hence, by choosing a different output transformation R, the errors in the
directions c 3 and c4 can be separated in such a way that they no longer affect the
failure signature. The improved output transformation that achieves this
separation is:
R = [ CAb3 CAb4 c3 c4 1-1
	
(4.28)
and the new transformed output error vector E is:
E3
E4
E =RE— 
Ebl
Eb2
where E3 and E4 contain the failure signatures of actuators 3 and 4 respectively,
and Eb1 and Eb2 only contain the error residuals due to the unmodeled modes, and
correspond to the first and second bending mode respectively (actually Eb1	 E3
and Eb2 — E 4 )
Figure 4-33 shows the frequency response functions for the transfer from the
unmodeled eighth mode ip8 to the residuals E3 and E4 obtained using the improved
transformation R in (4.28), for Detection Filter #3 with no output filtering. These
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response functions show a remarkable improvement when compared with the
response functions in Fig. 4-28 obtained using the pseudo inverse as the output
transformation. Note that the low frequency gains are actually zero. It is
important to stress that these gains are zero because the low frequency gains of the
disturbance transfers of the rigid modes are zero. That is, the zero low frequency
gains in Fig. 4-33 are not particular to the unmodeled eighth mode, but they will
occur in the transfers of all the unmodeled modes.
The use of the improved output transformation solves the problem of the
unmodeled modes only at low frequencies within the bandwidth of the filter.
Output filtering is still needed to eliminate the high frequency components of the
residuals that lie outside the bandwidth of the filter. Detection Filter#3 with
output filtering and with the improved transformation was then tested in the
presence of four unmodeled modes and failure of actuator 4 at T = 1 sec.. Figure
4-34 shows the result of this simulation which was done under exactly the same
conditions as the simulation in Fig. 4-30, but with a different output
transformation. The improvement is remarkable. The low frequency components of
the residuals have been totally eiiminated and the failure signature is now clearly
visible. The small error residuals consist mainly of a high frequency component at
the frequency of the first unmodeled mode (i.e., 61.25 rad/sec.), that was not
filtered out completely by the output filter. This high frequency component can be
reduced further by increasing the order of the output filter.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the : tate and output error equations
with parameter errors in matrix C have the same structure as the error equations
with unmodeled modes (see Fig. 4-11). Then, it is easy to see that the use of the
improved output transformation produces transfers from 10 ; to the residuals E 3 and
E4
 with zero low frequency gains. Therefore, the use of the improved output
.,
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Figure 4-33: Detection Filter #3. Unmodeled Eighth Mode Transfer.
R = Improved Transformation.
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Figure 4-34: Detection Filter #3. Four Unmodeled Modes. Actuator 4 Failure
at T = 1 sec.. R = Improved Transformation. Output Filtering.
transformation also produces remarkable improvements in the performance of the
filter in the presence of parameter errors in C.
The parameter errors in the system matrix A consist only of the errors in the
frequencies of the two bending modes. From Fig. 4-9 and Fig. 4-21, it can be seen
that these errors affect only the loops corresponding to the bending modes, and
therefore, only generate errors in the residuals E3 and E4 Then, for the same
reasons explained before, the improved transformation totally separates these errors
from the failure signature. That is, the transfers from Oi to E3 and E4 are zero at
all frequencies, and therefore, the errors in the frequency of the two bending modes
generate absolutely no errors in the residuals E3
 and E4.
In the previous section, it was shown that Detection Filter #3 represented a
large improvement in the performance in the presence of parameter errors in
B. The new output transformation, however, only introduces a minor improvement.
i
2
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With this transformation, only the errors in B corresponding to the modal shapes of
the rigid modes generate errors in the residuals E 3 and F4. It is important to note
that the shapes of the rigid modes are usually very well known. Therefore, the
results shown in Figures 4-35 and 4-36 with 5% and 10% parameter errors in B are
too pessimistiz.
Detectioc Filter #3, with output filtering and with the improved output
transformation, was then tested in the presence of all types of model mismatch and
with actuator 4 failure time at T = 1 sec.. Figure 4-35 shows the results of the
simulation with four unmodeled modes and with 5% parameter uncertainties in all
the matrices A, B and C. Figure 4-36 shows the results of the same simulation but,
with 100'o parameter uncertainties in A, B and C. In both cases the failure
signature is clearly visible, and therefore, for the first time in this thesis it is
possible to detect and identify the failure of actuator 3 and 4 under realistic
conditions.
The use of the new output transformation results in very large improvements
in the performance of the filter in the presence of model mismatch. For this
reason, in the rest of this section, the new output transformation will be analyzed a
little further, and a new way of reading the detection information from the output
error will be introduced.
During nominal operation the error residuals due to model mismatch lie
mainly in a plane spanned by the vectors c 3
 and c4 , as was shown earlier in this
section. Then, when failure of actuator 3 or 4 occurs, the error residuals lie in the
space spanned by the vectors CAb 31 c3 and c4 or CAb4 , c3 and c4 respectively. So,
there are actually three output error spaces associated with this detection problem,
one space corresponding to the nominal operation and two spaces corresponding to
i	 the failure of actuators 3 and 4. The improved output transformation produces
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Figure 435: Detection Filter #3. Four Unmodeled Modes. Parameter Errors
in A, B and C = 5%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec..
R = Improved Transformation. Output Filtering.
excellent results because it is able to distinguish between these three spaces.
During nominal operation, it generates large error residuals in Eb 
t 
and Eby . and
when actuator 3 or 4 fails, it generates large error residuals in E 3, Eb and Eb, or
E4 , Eb and Eb respectively. Therefore, the residuals E 3 and E4 can detect and
1	 r
identify the failure of actuator 3 and 4 in the presence of model mismatch.
Detection	 Filter #3,	 as mentioned	 earlier	 in this	 section, produces
unidirectional output with any actuator failure event. However, the improved
transformation in (4.28) cannot be configured to detect more than two actuator
failure events since two directions of the transformation have to be dedicated t,o
suppress the effects of model mismatch. Therefore, Detection Filter #3 requires
•	 two improved output transformations in order to detect and identify the four
actuator failure events. For example, one transformation can be configured to
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Figure 436: Detection Filter #3. Four Unmodeled Modes, Parameter Errors
in A, B and C = 10%. Actuator 4 Failure at T = 1 sec..
R = Improved Transformation. Output Filtering.
detect failure of actuators 1 and 2, and the other transformation can be configured
to detect failure of actuators 3 and 4. Then, when actuator 1 fails, the residual E1
will grow while E2 will remain zero in the r gist transformation, and the residuals F3
and E 4 in the second transformation will both grow. Thus, the growth of three
residuals are needed to identify the failed actuator. This is a very undesirable
result because it complicates the decision algorithms and also increases the
possibilities of incorrect identifications.
A new way of reading the output error information that can identify the
failure of any number of actuators, will now be explained. Even though this new
way has some interesting advantages when compared with the output
transformation, the main reason it is introduced here is to help gain more insight
into the detection filter problem.
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The new approach, used in conjunction with output filtering, is illustrated in
Fig. 4-37. Note that the output error E+ is used instead of E, the reasons for this
becoming clear later. Each component of the vector E+ is filtered with a bandwidth
of 10 rad/sec. to eliminate the high frequency components produced by model
mismatch (the output filters have to be identical to preserve the unidirectionality
of E+ when a failure occurs). The filtered output error will be called v. When the
jth actuator fails, the output error v remains in the single direction given by the
vector b^ in (4.22).
Output
Filters
II v. b +^
cos- 1
IL
Figure 437: New Output Error Processing
he new approach, unlike the transformations used so far, treats the
>n and identification problems separately. Detection is based on ,the norm of
put error vector Y. During nominal operation, the detection residual JJvJJ is
. there is no model mismatch, and when a failure occurs, it becomes
intly nonzero. Therefore, by looking at the detection residual JJvJJ, the
of any actuator (actually any component) can be detected. To identify
IMI
0
v1 ...+vN
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which component has failed, p directionalit y residuals are generated that represent
the angles from Q to 90 degress between the output error vector v and the output
directions b^ for j = 1, 2 . p, corresponding to each actuator failure. During
nominal operation, these residuals have no significance, and therefore, are not
computed. When the jth actuator fails, the output error v remains in the direction
of vector bt, and therefore the directionality residual O j is zero while the other
directionality residuals have a nonzero value between 0 and 90 degrees. Hence, the
actuator that failed is the one corresponding to the directionality residual that was
zero (or closest to zero in the presence of model mismatch).
In an operational system, the directionality residuals should be computed only
when the detection residual becomes larger than a certain tolerance indicating that
a component has failed. In this thesis, however, since the interest is to analvze the
character of the residuals without actually making any decisions, the directionality
residuals will be computed starting at T = 1 sec., which is the time? at which the
failure occurs.
As mentioned earlier in this section, the presence of unmodeled modes
generates large low frequency errors in the residuals E 3
 and c corresponding to the
bending modes while generating negligible errors in the residuals E1 and c E3 and
E4 can be eliminated by only using Ei and c and the components of bJ
corresponding to the rigid modes, b^ and b^ , in the computation of the detection
and directionality residuals. But, since c and c+ are no longer needed in the
residual generation, there is no need for the detection filter to estimate the
amplitudes and amplitude rates of the bending modes and therefore, the states of
the detection filter corr--sponding to the bending modes can be eliminated. Hence,
the detection filter in the configuration shown in Fig. 426 will have only the four
states corresponding to the rigid modes. However, the measurement transformation
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matrix M must remain the same (4 X 4 nonsingular matrix) and therefore, the
mode shapes of the first two beading modes are still needed in the design of this
filter.
A Detection Filter designed in this way is characterized as having 4 modeled
modes and 2 detection and identification modes. Such a filter, then, has 4 states:
the number of detection and identification modes times two. A detection filter
with these characteristics was designed and was named Detection Filter #4.
Detection Filter
# of modeled modes = 4
#	 4etection and identification modes = 2 (4 states)
Poles: 4 detectioi: mace poles at -10rad/sec.
Detection Filter #4 uses the errors in the estimates of the rigid modes
a:nplitudes produced by the failure of an actuator to detect and identify the failed
actuator.
All the detection filters will ;>e tested with output filtering, as shown in Fig.
4-37, even in the case of no model mismatch, for the rest of this section.
EFigures 4-38 and 4-39 show the results of the simulations of Detection Filter
k
#4 with no model mismatch and with failure of actuators 1 and 4, respectively, at
	 ,s
T = 1 sec..
In both cases, the actuator failures create clearly evident signatures in the
9
detection residuals. Also, in both cases, the directionality residuals corresponding
to the failed actuators remain at zero while the other directionality residuals
become clearly greater than zero.
However, these simulations show a big difference in the "ability" of Detection
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Figure 4-38: Detection Filter #4. No Model Mismatch.
Actuator 1 Failure at T = 1 sec.. Output Filtering.
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Filter #4 to ideutify correctly the actuator that failed in the presence of model
mismatch. It is intuitively clear that the ability of the detection filter to identify
correctly the failure of the jth actuator in the presence of model mismatch is
related to the smallest of the angular distances between the output direction
corresponding to actuator j failure and the output directions corresponding to the
other actuator failures. If this angle is large, it will take a large error residual due
to model mismatch to "rotate" the output error in order to result in an incorrect or
undetermined identification. If this angle is small, the opposite happens. From now
on, this angle will be referred to as the "phase margin far actuator j." The phase
margin for actuator 1 is 12 degrees while for actuator 4 is 44 degrees. Therefore,
the ability of Detection Filter #4 to identify correctly the failure of actuator 1 in
the presence of model mismatch, is much smaller than its ability to identify
correctly the failure of actuator 4.
The physical interpretation of the phase margin is very clear. The phase
margin for actuator 1 corresponds to the angular distance between the failure
direction of actuator 1 and the failure direction of actuator 2, as can be seen in Fig.
4-38. These two actuators are placed next to each other, with a separation of 2
feet, at the end of the beam (Fig. 3-1). The control effects of each of the actuators
upon the rigid mode corresponding to the displacement of the beam, are identical.
Therefore, what differentiates the failure of actuator 1 from the failure of actuator
2, is the difference in the control of these actuators upon the rigid mode
corresponding to rotation. Since they are placed close together at the end of the
beam, they both have very similar influence on the rotation of the beam.
Therefore, since the effect upon the rotation and displacement of the beam due to a
control being applied to actuator 1 is very similar to the effect due to the same
control being applied t.:) actuator 2, it is very difficult to distinguish between the
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failures of those two actuators from the amplitudes of the rigid modes.
On the other hand, since actuator 4 is 3.5 feet away from the closest
actuator, actuator 3, and since this actuator is at the center of the beam, the
difference in the control of these actuators upon the rotation and translation of the
beam, is much larger. This accounts for the large phase margin for actuator 4.
Detection Filter #4 was then tested in the presence of four unmodeled modes.
Figure 4-40 shows the results corresponding to the failure of actuator 1 and Fig.
4-41 shows the results corresponding to the failure of actuator 4. In both cases, the
failure signatures in the detection residuals were much larger than the noise due to
model mismatch. The dominant component in the noise has the frequency of the
first unmodeled mode that was not completely eliminated by the output, filter, as
was the case for Detection Filter #3 in Fig. 4-34. The analysis of the directionality
residuals is a little more involved. Whenever the failure signature is smaller than
the noise due to model mismatch, the output error is dominated by the noise, and
therefore, it is no longer unidirectional thus producing the large rapid vertical
oscillations. Hence, the directionality residuals are significant only when the failure
signature, in the detection residual, is larger than the background noise, and even
in this case it is not guaranteed that the directionality residuals will identify
correctly the failed actuator. For example, in the case of failure of actuator 1, the
failure can be correctly, but marginally, identified for a very short period of time,
even though the failure signature is much larger than the noise during most of the
failure interval. On the other hand, the failure of actuator 4 can be clearly
identified whenever the failure signature becomes a little larger than the noise.
The poor performance of Detection Filter #4 when trying to identify the
failure of actuator 1, was not due to large model mismatch Poise, but rather d.ue to
the small phase margin for actuator 1. In fact, the noise was much smaller than
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the failure signature, allowing a very clear detection of the failure. One way of
solving this problem is to increase the orders of the output filters in order to reduce
the noise even further. Another solution, is to increase the phase margin for
actuator 1 by augmenting the number of detection and identification modes.
However,- keep in mind that the estimation of the higher frequency modes are more
affected by noise, and that was the reason for eliminating them in the design of
Detection Filter #4. Therefore, this approach will be successful only if the
improvement resulting from the larger phase margin is greater than the increase in
noise due to model mismatch. To test this solution, Detection Filter #5 was
designed with 4 modeled modes and 3 detection and identification modes.
Detection Filter #5:.
# of modeled modes = 4
# of detection and identification modes = 3 (6 states)
#Poles: 6 detection space poles at -10rad/sec..
Detection Filter #5 uses the two rigid modes and the first bending mode in
the process of detecting and identifying an actuator failure. Figure 4-42 shows the
results of testing Detection Filter #5 with no model mismatch and with failure of
actuator 1 at T = 1 sec.. Note that by incorporating the bending mode, the phase
margin for actuator 1 increased from 12 to 37 degrees.
Detection Filter #5 was then tested with four unmodeled modes and failure
of actuator 1 at T = 1 sec.. The results of this simulation are shown in Fig. 4-43.
The failure signature is still clearly evident in the detection residual and the result
of adding a bending mode to the filter only produced a very small increase in the
low frequency components of the noise. The larger phase margin ;
 combined with a
very low increase in noise, resulted in directionality residuals that clearly identify
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the failure of actuator 1. Therefore, it can be concluded that the addition of the
bending mode to the filter was sucessful in improving the identification capabiliti:-s
of the filter.
To clarify what has been explained so far, the second bending mode will be
added to the filter. Then, the resulting filter is Detectioe Filter #3 and the only
difference is in the processing of the output error. Figure 4-44 shows the results of
the simulation of Detection Filter #3 with no model mismatch and actuator 1
failure at T = 1 sec.. The phase margin increased to 70 degrees, twice the phase
margin of Detection Filter #5. Figure 4-45 shows the same simulation but with
four unmodeled modes. The detection capabilities of the filter have been greatly
impaired by the presence of large low frequency error residuals due to model
mismatch. As explained earlier in this section, the large low frequency residuals are
due to the large low frequency gain of the disturbance transfer corresponding to the
second bending mode. However, note that the detection residual can still be
generated from the rigid modes only, as was done in Detection Filter #4, while
using the four modes in the calculation of the directionality residuals. In such a
case, the advantage of the very low noise of the rigid modes in the detection of the
failures, is combined with the advantage of the larger phase margin of the higher
order filter in the identification of the failure. The results of the directionality
residuals may be a little misleading. These residuals correctly indicate the failure
of actuator 1. However, since the noise due to model mismatch is very slowly
varying, it is not clear whether the residuals would continue to indicate correctly
the failure of actuator 1 if the simulation was continued beyond 2 seconds.
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4.3.3 Detection Filter With Observer
In the previous subsection, the problem of the large numbers of unmodeled.
modes in the detection filter with N == p was solved by introducing a new output
transformation. The large improvement that resulted from this was due to the
rigid modes that rejected the low frequency noise, and therefore, provided clear
detection and identifio ition information. In some cases, however, the model of the
flexible structure might contain only one rigid mode or no rigid modes at all. In
such a case, the noise rejection properties of the low frequency modes (see Eq.
(4.27)) might n ,-', be good enough to reject the low frequency noise due to the
unmodeled modes (the high frequency noise can always be eliminated with output
filtering). The Detection Filter with Observer introduced is this subsection is
a possible solution when this problem arises. However, it should be made clear that
due to a lack of time the properties of such a configuration have not been analyzed
is detail, and mainly the motivation for this approach is presented in this thesis.
The problem of model mismatch in detection filters is that the requirement of
having small error residuals seems to be incompatible with the requirement of
having large failure signatures. The reduction in the error residuals due to model
mismatch is achieved by improving the ability of the filter to track the output
vector y, but in so doing, the ability of the filter to track the output vector y in
the presence of an actuator failure will also improve, resuAing in a smaller failure
signature. For example, the error residuals can be reduced by moving the detection
space poles to the left in the s plane, but this also results in a smaller failure
signature. The Detection Filter with Observer in Fig. 4-46 eliminates the error
residuals due to those modes whose shapes and frequencies are known but are not
	 .
modeled in the reduced order detection filter with N = p, without reducing the
i
yF
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Figure 4-46: The Detection Filter with Observer
failure signature.
The model of the observer contains all the structural modes of the beam that
are known, while the model of the detection filter contains as many modes as the
number of independent displacement measurements. The equations of the observer
are
ico=A0io+Bauc +Do(y-y)
Y = Co Xo
and the equations of the detection filter are
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- observer are defined as the modes that are not
• in the detection filter. The unmodeled modes of
the detection filter are defined as the modes that are modeled in the observer but
not modeled in the filter. The purpose of the observer is to obtain good estimates
of the amplitudes of the unmodeled modes of the filter in the presence of model
mismatch and more important, in the presence of actuator failures. These
estimates are multiplied by their corresponding vectors c i
 from matrix C u, and the
results are subtracted from y to Obtain yF . The detection filter, then, uses yF as
the measurement vector.
Therefore, when there is no model mismatch between the model of the beam
and the model used in the observer and when there is no actuator failure, the
estimates of the filter unmodeled modes are correct and the vector yF is the one
resulting from those structural modes that are modeled in the filter. Hence. since
the detection filter does not see any unmodeled modes, the residuals E are zero.
When an actuator failure occurs, the result will depend on the ability of the
observer to estimate the amplitudes of the unmodeled modes of the filter in the
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presence of the actuator failure. If this ability is good, then the filter measurement
vector YF will contain very little components resulting from the filter unmodeled
modes, and therefore, the error residuals due to the filter unmodeled modes will be
very small and identification of the failed component will be possible. On the other
hand, if the observer is not good at estimating the amplitudes of the filter
unmodeled modes in the presence of actuator failures, when an actuator failure
occurs, yF will contain large components due to the errors in the estimates of the
filter unmodeled mode amplitudes resulting in large error residuals in E that will
make the identification impossible.
Therefore, while the detection capabilities of the reduced order filter will be
greatly improved by the use of any good observer, the identification capabilities
will be improved only if this observer is good at estimating the amplitudes of the
filter unmodeled modes in the presence of actuator failures. Note that this
requirement is exactly the opposite of the requirement of the detection filter in
which we want an actuator failure to produce large errors in the estimates.
Furthermore, it seems that in this case, there is no contradiction between requiring
the observer to be insensitive to actuator failures and requiring the observer to be
insensitive to model mismatch.
A thorough analysis on whether it is possible to design obervers with such
properties and how to design them has not been done in this thesis. It is
reasonable to expect that observers that rely heavily on the measurements to
produce the state estimates will have little sensitivity to actuator failures. An
observer with this property has large bandwidth and high frequency poles. This is
the case if a detection filter is used as the observer, since the failure signature
caused by an actuator .failure can be arbitrarily reduced by moving the detection
space poles to the left in the s - plane.
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The observer used in this thesis was designed using the continuous Kalman
filter approach and a seven mode model of the beam. The resulting filter had some
high frequency poles very close to the high frequency undamped structural modes,
and therefore, it was necessary to use output filtering in the Detection Filter.
However, it is believed that the output filtering can be avoided by a more careful
design of the observer.
Figure 4-47 shows the result of simulating the filter - observer combination
with no motel mismatch. That is, the evaluation model of the beam has seven
modes, tb-- observer has seven modes ant the reduced order detection filter has
four modes. The reduced order detection filter used is Detection Filter #3 with the
pseudo inverse as the output transformation. The initial conditions of the beam.,
observer and detection fitler are all zero and actuator 4 fails at T = 1 sec..' Figure
4-47 should be compared with Fig. 4-30 (actually in Fig. 4-30 there is one more
unmodeled mode but its contribution to the error residuals is negligible). The
failure signature is now clearly visible. The use of the observer produced a
remarkable improvement in the detection of the failure, as was expected, and also
produced a very large impr-,)vement in the identification of the failure.
The eighth structural mode was added to the evaluation model of the beam
and the simulation repeated. The effect of the filter - observer unmodeled mode 	 41
was so small that the output residuals were almost identical to the ones in Fig.
4-47.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the use of the observer was successful in
improving the performance of Detection Filter #3 in the presence of unmodeled
modes. The performance of the filter - observer configuration was not tested in the
presence of parameter errors.
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Figure 4-47: Detection Filter #3 with Observer.
Failure of Actuator 4 at T = 1 sec.. Output Filtering.
Chapter 5
Conclusions and Recommendations
When the number of modes modeled into the detection filter was larger than
the number of sensors, the detection filter could not be configured to detect more
than three actuator failure events, and the corresponding state space was divided
into detection and completion spaces. Moreover, the specification of the location of
the filter poles did not result in a unique detector gain D. However, the algorithms
used in this thesis, suggested by Beard, produced a unique gain matrix D by
snaking the completion spaces invariant. As a result of all this, the filter design
was complicated and relied heavily on software.
The dynamics of these filters were very difficult to analyze and produced very
unexpected results. The transfer properties of the detection filter that describe its
performance in the presence of model mismatch, showed a surprising sensitivity to
the location of the completion space poles explaining the results obtained in the
simulations. When all of the filter poles were at -10rad/sec., the presence of an
unmodeled mode created large low frequency error residuals that, completely
obscured the failure signature, and the presence of unrealistically low levels of
parameter errors also resulted in unsuccessful detections and identification of the
failure. By moving the completion space poles to -100rad/sec., the performance of
the detection filter in the presence of model mismatch was remarkably improved.
However, the detection filter still could not tolerate realistic levels of parameter
errors.
The detection filters with N = p (number of modeled structural modes equal
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to number of sensors) have several advantages when compared to detection filters
I ' with N > p. Perhaps the most important of them is that detection filters with N
= p can be configured to detect any number of actuator failure events by placing
the filter poles in an appropriate way (e.g., placing all the poles at the same
location.) The design of these filters is trivial and does not need any specialized
software. Also, their dynamics are very simple and easy to analyze, since they do
not involve completion spaces. This in turn allow, the designer to make a thorough
frequency response analysis of the effects of the different types of model mismatch,
and make decisions on how to use the degrees of freedom that he has at his disposal
like the location of the detection filter poles, bandwidth of the output filter, choice
of output transformation, etc. Finally, another important advantage of these filters
is that they perform much better in the presence of parameter errors.
The problem of the detection filters with N = p is their large number of
unmodeled modes. The high frequency components of the error residuals due to
unmodeled modes lying outside the bandwidth of the filter can always be filtered
out without reducing the failure signature. Then, the problem is caused by the
components of the residuals lying within the bandwidth of the filter. This problem
was dealt with in two different ways. First, the performance of the detection filter
in the presence of model mismatch was improved by choosing a different output
transformation. This resulted in a detection filter that was able to perform
satisfactorily in the presence of the unmodeled modes and in the presence of
realistic levels of parameter errors. The second approach was to use an observer to
subtract the components of the unmodeled modes from the measurements y.
From the analysis and simulations done in this thesis, it appears that a
combination of all the techniques explained in subsection 4.3.1 has the best
potential to solve the most severe problems of model mismatch in the detection of
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actuator failures in flexible structures with displacement sensors. Such a
combination refers to a detection filter with N = p, improved output
transformation, output filtering and observer.
The recommended areas of research related to the problem analyzed in this
thesis are:
1)to investigate whether different methods of assigning the n - v F completion
poles, that do not require the invariance of the completion spaces, could not result
in more robust detection filters,
2)to investigate and develop different ways of reading the detection and
identification information from the output error in the presence of model mismatch,
3)to study all the aspects . related to the detection filter with observer. For
example, to study the design and properties of the observer that best fit this
application, and to study the robustness properties of the filter - observer
combination,
4)to study the robustness properties of detection filters designed to detect
actuator failures in flexible structures with both displacement and rate
measurements,
5)to study the performance of the detection filter in a more realistic
environment that includes a control system and disturbances.
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